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Aim of the Thesis: 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The economy of the United States has spent seven of the 
past twelve years in a state of partial or full mobilization. 
This resulted in a period of unprecedented Government spend-
ing which i ncreased to an all-time high the amounts of money 
1 
in circulation. Earnings of firms and incomes of individuals 
increased. Despite the fact that the productivity of the 
economy had risen to such high levels, the demand of the Govern-
ment and private sector could not both be met completely in 
the periods of mobilization. 
Of the various measures taken to maintain stability in 
the economy, one of the most significant lines of attack has 
been that on credit. In this thesis, it will be a ttempted to 
indicate the approach taken in the field of oon'struction 
cre dit and whatever importance it may have had. 
Regulation X: 
The Regulation was a law regulating terms on construction 
credit. It was enacted under the Defense Production Act of 
1950 and was l ater revised in 1951, and 1952. The Regulati on 
was not a new idea; it had been used in much the same form in 
World War II and in the early post-war era. 
One purpose of the Regulation wa s to curtail credit in 
the construction field, and, in this way, act as one of the 
dampers on the inflationary tendencies. A second and as 
important purpose was to make more materials, resources 
and man power available to the necessary mobilization needs. 
Much defense construction was needed, and had credit 
been unlimited, the bidding by both the non-essential and 
essential demand would have resulted in higher prices, greater 
inflation and greater shortage of materials. The full influ-
ence of the Regulation is not exactly ascertainable but that 
it did help considerably is acknowledged by most . 
Organization of the Thesis: 
The introduction has been an attempt to give some back-
ground to the purpose of the thesis. 
The second chapter attempts to show the necessity of mone-
tary controls in a period of mobilization, and how selective 
monetary controls are used so as not to influence segments of 
the economy other than those at which they are aimed. 
In Chapter III,isashort summary of the monetary action 
that was taken throughout the economy not only in the field 
of selective controls but other related policy. An appendix 
has been added to give a little more to an often discussed 
topic--the effect of the interest rate on investments by the 
firm and individuals. 
Chapter IV is a synopsis- of the Regulation itself and 
the amendments and revision added to the original {Korean War) 
2 
Regulation as enacted in the Defense ~reduction Act of 1950 . 
The appendix to the chapter is a more detailed su~~ary of 
the Re gulation. 
Chapter V is on the formula brought out in 1952 to de term-
ine the imposition or lifting of the Regulation. This replaces 
the need of the President to designate the use of th'e Regul a-
tion, but does not r emove his authority to do as he sees fit. 
Chapter VI is a discussion of the import ance of construc-
tion in the trade cycle and us how it is usually interpreted 
in the sense of the Building Cycle . It attempts to pcrtray 
the influence the great volume of post-war constructaon has 
had upon the economy from 1946 to the expiration of the Regu-
l ation in 1952 . 
A survey made by the Survey of Consume r Finance for t he 
Board of Governors wa s made for t he first six months the 
Regulation was in force. In Chapter VII, the results of the 
survey, s howing the buying habits for housing , are given. 
Added to this has bee n my own study of the buying habits for 
the rest of the period. 
3 
A history of the Regulation is the subject of Cha pter VIII. 
Here, the importance of the Regulation is brought out and also 
the other fa ctors that aided and hindered oonstruct i on in 
tha t period of time in which the Regulation wa s in force. 
The conclusion. Chapter IX, i s a discussion of the lifting 
of the Regulation and a short study of the period following. 
It should enable a clearer picture to be shown of the effec-
tiveness of the Regulation. 
4 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ROLE OF SELECTIVE CONTROLS IN A MOBILIZED ECONOMY 
Partial or full mobilization, as a rule, will be accom-
panied by inflation. 'l'he degree of inflation and the length 
of time it takes for it to become apparent depends upon the 
level of economic activity in the nation at the time the 
mobilization program is undertaken; the inflation results 
from real and monetary pressure. une aspect of controlling 
inflation has been selective monetary control. 
Monetary ~ide of Inflation: 
One side to the inflation is the increa sed spending by 
the government for procurem9nt of war goods and the building 
up of the industrial base. 
'l'he money for the armament program for the most part is 
created. The government finances that part which it cannot 
r~ise through taxes with borrowing. This is done through 
t he sale of securities of varying maturities, to the indivi-
duals, insurance companies and banks. It is the sales to 
the commercial banks which are important. These banks buy 
the bonds from the government, paying with a demand deposit 
in the government's name. This ha,s 1the effect throughout 
the system of creating an amount of money which is a multi-
ple of the value of the bonds. It is this great increase of 
money that accentuates the inflation when bottlenecks and 
strains arise in the eemnomy. 
5 
Real Side of Inflation: 
In an economy in which there is some unemployment, there 
may be a considerable increase in activity before there is 
any real strain felt. As more snd more slack is taken up 
through the use of enemployment, resources and plant, bottle-
necks develop in those industries which had been at a higher 
degree of operation or in those in which the supply was less 
elastic. The price of the goods produced in these industries 
rises as plants are operated beyond the point of minimum 
6 
costs. This will cause hi gher costs to the users of these 
products. These higher costs of inputs and scarcity of resourc-
es, continual attempts to expand output, and the still greater 
increases in spending by the government, cause higher costs to 
spread throughout the economy. As the cost of living index 
(as it is so called) rises, and as employment increases, there 
are demands by l abor for pay increases. 
Effect of Income to Consumer: 
Interrelated with the great expenditures by the govern-
ment is the growing expenditures by consumers made possible 
by the large increases in tll! na-t -:1:onal income. Income is 
increased by higher wages and the large flow of labor into the 
defense industries. This creates a demand greater than supply , 
as even though the nation's total output is greater, much of 
it is for other purposes than consumption. 
Summary: 
This short summary of mobiliza tion shows the need for 
changes in policies in a partially or fully mobilized econ-
omy. All of these changes take place in any economy; it is 
the level of activity and the completeness of the mobilize-
tion that determine the degree. To combat the i inflationary 
trend there are some who feel t hat fiscal policy alone would 
be adequate. That would mean the government would tax all 
income earned in excess of the value of the available goods. 
Taxing to the extent to which it spends would not seem ade-
quate in as is indicated by a budgetary surplus for the 
early period ot the Korean War. 'l'here were other :rectors 
besides government spending, however, which contributed to 
1 that inflationary trend. 
Monetary Controls: 
Monetary controls is the other major field of study in 
attempts to curb inflation. · There are two classifications of 
monetary controls: general and selective. General controls 
include the well known interest rate, reserve requirements, 
and discount rate. 
General Controls: 
The reserve requirement controls have not been used too 
commonly in past years as an effective control becua se of 1h e 
relative ease of the banks in meeting their quota. For the 
most part, banks have maintained amounts over their require-
ments. The discount rate was raised from 1.5 per cent to 1.75 
7 
1. Professor Hansen also mentions the inadequacy of fis cal 
policy to combat inflation in a mobilized economy, Monetary 
Theory and Fiscal Policy, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1949. 
per cent, hardly enough to make a dif'f'erence except in large 
transactions. 
The interest rate, however, has been used, but in a 
different sense than is commonly associated with interest 
rate change. In February of' 1951, the Federal Reserve Banks 
stopped supporting government bonds until the price fell from 
10? .5 to around 9 6. Inbother words, they allowed the interest 
rate to rise from about 2.1 per cent to about 3 per cent. 
This rise in the interest rate had no effect on the demand for 
funds, but did limit the lending power of instututions. 
1nsurance companies, for instance, could not afford to sus-
tain the capitol loss of' liquidating their government bonds 
8 
at 96 which had been bought at prices as high as 10?.5 to yield 
2 
about 2.1 per cent. 
Selective Controls: 
The selective controls are those whoae aim is to regulate 
a particular sector of' the economy,for example, regulations on 
margin requirements, consumer credit and rea l estate credit. 
They are used in the hope of regulating what is felt are jump 
off points for an inflation. 'l 1he purpose is to control some 
parts of' the economy where needed and leave the rest as little 
affected as possible. 
Monetary policy, like fisca l policy, alone cannot control 
an inflation. In fact, some feel any mone tary policy which 
2. See Appendix a t the end of this chapter. 
could might be so drastic a s to cause chaos. 3 
Monetary and ~·is cal Aspects: 
It is often very difficult to separate fisca l and mone-
tary policy; one often involves ~e other. ~n a mobilization 
economy, more money must be created with which to purchase 
the needed goods. This creation of money is an aspect of 
monetary policy; whereas, the spending is fiscal policy. 
Oftentimes, monetary policy is aimed at controlling the 
spending in the economy; whereas, fiscal policy does not 
have too much regard for this. No matter what the price ar 
a n article of war is, if it is needed, it must be purchased. 
As mentioned above, it is the heavy spending by the mi litary 
and subsequently large r incomes of individuals and their 
increasec spending which send the inflation on its way. The 
increased spending by the consumer creates the basis of selec-
tive controls. A great contribution to the inflation is the 
ultimate consumer spending for goods and materials aetually 
decreasing in supply in contrast t o the increasing demand. 
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Many of the goods the consumer wants are produced from materia ls 
needed by the military for tools of war. This causes a shift 
in both the demand and supply curve of the consumer sector. 
The demand curve moves to the right, and the supply curve moves 
to the left. The shift in the supply curve is largely caused 
by the allocation of a portion of the resources for military 
use. Because of the priority of the milita ry, these needs 
3. 1oc. cit. Hansen 
- - · 
are met and the residual is availa ble for consumer use. 
The shift in the demand curve can be accounted for 
through the increase in income of the nation. Taxes may 
be increased, but as a rule, they will not absorb the full 
increase in income. 
The Demand and Supply Curve 
Problem of Allocation of Goods: 
The result of the shift in demand and supply curves is 
a smaller supply and at a higher price available to con-
sumers. It might be argued that the materials could be 
rationed out to individuals at a set price, but this would 
involve many problems which might not be feasible to under-
take in other than a fully mobilized war economy. When the 
necessity is apparent enough, people will accept rationing 
and price control, but in a simi-mobilized economy, such a s 
we had in the early Korean War, the war and the necessity 
seemed too remote for the people to accept these mea sures. 
The pricing system is itself a type of rationing sys-
tem, but in an economy of rathe r free credit, it is not 
quite as effective as where credit is ti ghter or non-exist-
10. 
~ 
ent. With loose credit ig the economy, people can afford to 
pay the higher prices charged for goods that are short. As 
a rule, high levels of economic activity are characterized 
by fairly liberal credit terms. This is largely due to the 
fact that at these times of good business conditions, busi-
nessmen are optimistic and do not worry about repayment; 
they feel that the prosperity will continue. The loose 
credit only adds more fuel to the fire. 
Situation at the Outbreak of Korea: 
In ~une of 1950, at the outbreak of the Korean War, the 
nation was at a relatively high level of economic activity. 
There had been a mild slump in busine~s in the middle of 
11 
1949 to the beginning of 1950, but by the spring of the latter 
year, the economy was well on its way to recovery. A very 
important factor in this recovery was the start of a record 
building boom. It is generally accepted that the building 
cycles are significant in the greatest periods of booms and 
4 depression; this building cycle had started in 1945. A 
large portion of the credit for this construction activity 
was being created by the commercial bank. This added an ever 
increasing supply of money in the economy. 
Because of the heavy borrowing by consumers for building , 
and the large expenditure by the government for military con-
struction, it became apparent that a policy of credit restric-
tion was needed. One of these selective credit controls was 
a credit restriction o~ housing, Regulation X. This form of 
4. Chapter vi discusses the Building Cycle. 
regulati on had be en used in the Second World War where it 
had been of considerable aid, although other measures, such 
as priority allocations, had been necessary. 
12 
CHAPTER' III 
CREDIT CONTROL MEASURES 1950-1952 
The preceedin~ chapter showed that inflation is one of 
the major problems accompanying mobilization in an economy. 
At the outbreak of the Korean War and the mobilization, meas-
ures were immediately taken to restrict unnecessary credit; 
these measures were later broadened in 1951 and 1952. 
Reserve Requirements: 
In January of 1951, reserve requirements were raised to 
13 
L their legal limit in all banks except at central reserve cities. 
This increased the reserves by about $2 billion, ~1 billion of 
which was made up of after-Christmas return~ and the rest was 
made up of sales of Federal securities to the ~·ederal Reserve 
to increase the banks' reserves. This also had the effect of 
reducing the volume of short-term securities which the banks 
could sell or cash at maturity in order to expand loans. 
Interest Rate Controversy: 
For some time there had been agitation to allowing the 
interest rate to rise. A low interest rate was desired by the 
Treasury in order to keep lower the costs of refunding the 
debt which had a turnover of about $50 billion per year. It 
was felt that if the rate were allowed to rise nearer to where 
1. Federal Reserve Bull~tin, Board of Governors of the ~ederal 
Reserve System, July, 1951, Vol. 37 No. 7 P 742. 
it would go, it left free, that the cost of financing the debt 
and increasing war expenditures might be greatly increased, 
and that it would also cause instability in the money market 
a t a time when stability was all important. 2 It was recognized 
that the increased spending by the government for defense and 
expenditures by plants for defense expansion was quite infla-
14 
tionary, but other measures were felt more desirable than altere-
tion of the interest rate. 
The Treasury did not feel there was any tangible evidence 
that a policy of credit rationing to individuals could be effec-
ted by fractional changes in the interest rate. To combat the 
double problem of inflation and insufficient funds, a policy of 
increased taxes was felt more desirable. To supplement this, 
there should be selective controls and wage and price controls 
to attack inflation. 
In order to reduce inflationary pressure from the govern-
ment borrowing, as much of the debt as feasibly possible wa s 
placed in non-bank hands, such as individuals, insurance com-
panies and mutual savings banks, and there was a reduction in 
the amount sold to commercial and Federal Reserve Banks. This 
had been a steady goal of the Treasury, arid the holding or Fed-
eral securities by the commercial banks had declined to a post-
war (World War II} low in 1950. The significance of this is 
that the inflationary base on which the banks can lend out a 
multiple amount is removed. An indication of the effectiveness 
2. Secretary of the Treasury, Synder, Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, ~anuary 25, 1951, Vol. 773 No. 4980 
of the policy was that on January 1, 1951, 25 per cent of 
the .t!'ederal debt was in savings bonds alone. 3 
Another reason for not tampe ring with the interest rate 
was that of causing instability in the money market. Allow• 
ing the rateto rise a little, lletting the price or securi-
ties fall, might cause t h e price of bonds to fDll much more 
than had been desired. That is Keynes' idea of liquidity 
preference might come into effect. If people and banks felt 
the interest rate might rise, they might desire liquidity in 
anticipation of further rises. Banks and insurance companies 
had become adjusted to a 2 1/2 per cent rate of interest, and 
a change would upset this. 
Opposed to this point of view, that high interest rates 
would raise the cost of mobilization, there were some who felt 
that ~ow interest rates had caused it to be greater than should 
have been. A result of selling Federal securities, a large 
share of which did go to commercial banks, and of keeping the 
interest rate low, was that the value of money fell because 
of the volume in circulation. The consequences of the cheap 
money has been a rise in the cost of goods, arms and services. 
The Treasury is the largest buyer of these products in the 
economy, and had the Treasury let the Federal Reserve allow 
the interest rate to ll:ncrease, the cost of the mobilization 
might have been much l ower. The lower costs of products 
would have offset many times the higher costs of borrowing.4 
3. Ibid. 
4. n;-w. Michener, Commercial & Financial Chronicle, New York 
City, June 2, 1951; P 4 (2552) Vol. 1?3 No. 5022 
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This would be a rather difficult problem to verify. That 
there has be en a greater circulation because of a lower 
rate, there is no doubt, but the basic problem of govern-
ment spending and borrowing from commercial banks is still 
t here. 
The Federal Re s e rve, in allowing the rates to rise, did 
not do so from the point of view that there would be less . 
borrowing with a higher rate of interest because of the hi ghe r 
cost of borrowing. The amount the gove rnment borrows is not 
very much affected by the interest rate; it is determined by 
the need for money. 
Long-term bonds had been supported by the Federal Re serve 
at a price of 107 1/2 to keep the inte rest rate at about 2.1 
per cent on these securities. As long a s the Federal Rese rve 
bought bonds from whoever wanted to sell them, there was no 
5 difficulty in keeping the rate low. This s i tuation was not 
too bad until the inflationary pressures from the mobiliza-
tion spe nding came to the fore. Insurance companies had been 
selling their bonds which were yielding 2.1 pe r cent to be 
able to obtain funds to lend at higher r a tes of interest. 
These securities also served as reserves to the banks and 
enabled the banks to grant further credit. This expansion of 
credit, from the ins urance company loans and from the effect 
of increased reserves throughout the banking system, increased 
considerably the money in ci rculation. 
5. The bonds were not sold directly to the Federal Re serve, 
but were sold t o the membe r banks who would use t hem a s 
reserve at whatever value the Federa l Re serve wa s buying. 
16 
Insurance companies (and other holder of bonds) could 
not afford to take the capital loss from having their securi-
ties purchased at 10? 1/2 sell at a price of from 9? to 95. 
Thus, this amount of credit was, in a sense, frozen. 
The action by the Federal Reserve in allowing bond price s 
to fall and that of the Treasury in exchanging longer term 
and higher yielding securities in place of the old long-term 
bonds curtailed considerably the desire of the insurance com-
panies to lend to private parties. This prevented a consid-
erable amount of money from entering the economy. 
1fuile the Treasury attempted mmmobilize part of the 
public debt, the Federal Reserve System reduced its purchases 
of short-term securities to just that necessary to short-run 
6 
adjustments in the money market. The Federal Reserve reduced 
the exce ss reserves of member banks considerably in the first 
half of 1951 and even caused banks to borrow to maintain their 
reserve position. 7 At this same ti..n'le, the Treasury did not call 
up its callable bonds,preventing about $8 billion from enter-
ing the economy. By also raising its short-term rates, it 
was enabled to exchange Treasury certificates for other market-
able short-term securities JT eventing some liquidity here. 
Selective Controls: 
Selective credit controls were enacte d almost imme d iately 
after ~he outbreak of hos\ilities. The two major ones were 
6. Ibid. 
?. ~-
1? 
Regulation W and Regulation x. 
Regulation W controlled credit on household appliances 
and automobiles; it covered the broad field of consumer 
durables. The effect of the Hegulation was achieved through 
requiring certain down payments and limiting the maturity of 
the loan. 
Regulation X, effective October 12, had the same provi-
sions, except that it applied to housing credit. There had 
been prior restriction on housing credit pending the inaugura-
tion of the Hegula ti on. In concurrence with the Board of Gov-
ernors, the Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Admin-
istration issued similar restriction on credit over which it 
had influence. The Regulation was not too effective at first 
as it did not control credit that had already been given on 
which firm committments were made or to non-insured houses. 
By the middle of 1951, however, it covered about all construc-
tion originally included, and subsequent amendments increased 
its coverage in 1951 and 1952. 
Regulation V on stock market credit, exerted restraint 
on this type of ci'edi t. In early 1951, margin requirements 
were raised from 50 per cent to 75 per cent of the market 
value of the securities. 
Voluntary Cre dit Restraint: 
The Voluntary Credit Hestraint Program was one set up to 
cover non-essential credit not coming unde r other selective 
controls. Unde r authority of the Pre sident g i ven in the 
18 
De fense Production Act of 1950 and after approval of the 
Attorney ueneral, the Board of Governors helped establish a 
8 Voluntary ~redit Hestraint ~ommittee. The Committee wa s 
composed of representatives from commercial ~nd s avings banks, 
s aving s and loan associ ations and insurance companies. lts 
primary duties were to distinguish between essential and non-
e ssentia l credit. Although it cannot be ascertained just how 
much influence the committee had in curtailing credit in the 
economy, it would seem it had been of considerable help in 
that many l arge credit applicati ons were rejected or delayed. 
On the whole, the committee was deemed to have been quite 
successful. 
Summary:· 
The effect of greater reserve requirements, change s in 
the discount and interest rate , selective controls and volun-
t a ry cre di t restriction has been considerable in pr e ven ting 
inflation. The inflati onary situation, it 16 conce eded, would 
have been very much worse had it not been for the se controls. 
As it was, the r e was some inflation, but it was rather well 
controlled. 
8. Ibid. 
19 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III 
The effect of interest changes upon investment by busi-
ness firms is not considered to be too important for inter-
mediate term loans and not too much more so for the longer 
term loans. It has been generally assumed that the margin 
between the ma rginal efficiency of capital (to use Keynesian 
terms) and the interest rate is large enough to absorb some 
changes in the interest rate in the short run. A large in-
crease in the interest rate of 8 per cent more would effect t he 
amount borrowed, but a change of 1 or 2 per cent even would 
9 
probably not hinder investment. At higher rates of interest, 
the firms may not borrow so much, but within a relatively 
l arge range at any one moment of time, the demand curve for 
loanable funds can be assumed tote rather inelastic to changes 
in the interest rate. It is probably more the supply curve 
of loanable funds that is a ffected by charges or anticipated 
charges in the interest rate. 
The demand curve for loanable funds for individuals, how-
ever, may be a f fected by different considerations. The demand 
curve for short-term loans, such as those for appliances a nd 
automobiles, may not be greatly or not al all affecte d by mod-
erate changes in the interest rate. That for longer term 
loans, however, such as those on housing, might be assumed to 
9. loc. cit. Hansen uses as an example an increase of 15 
l)er cent. 
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be somewhat more sensitive to changes in the interest rate. 
One indication of this may have been the greater borrowing 
done by veterans in lower income groups as compared to non-
veterans. With the provision of Veterans Administration, 
interest rates of 4 per cent and 4 1/2 per cent were avail-
able to veterans, while that for non-veterans in the corres-
ponding income level were 5 1/2 and 6 per cent. The signi-
ficance of this can be seen in the following table {at the 
end of Chapter III). 
It is quite obvious that at the higher rate and larger 
loans, the monthly paym.e nt becomes so large that the "rent" 
for the month be.comes rather high. From a given salary 1 the 
higher the interest rate, the more difficult it becomes to 
pay off the principal. As will be shown below, the average 
price paid for homes is about 2 1/2 times the annual salary 
of tbe individual for those earning less than ~10,000. The 
interest charges on a $15,000, 6 per cent loan would be $900 
annually or ~75 per month. 
Vfuen the principal payments are added to t h is, which on 
a $15,000 loan are $750 per ~ear bases on a twenty-year matur-
ity, this g ives a monthly payment of $62.50 per month. The 
total "rent" then, of houses on which a ~15,000 loan has been 
taken, would be $137.50 per month. In this case, the interest 
payments for the first few years are actually more than the 
payments on the principal. 
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When the interest rates are allowed to rise, all rates 
will be affected. The longer term rates are probably affec-
ted less and more slowly than the shorter term rates, but 
their effect may be more important. 10 Whether the r i se of 
interest rates in 1951 did curtail some of the demand for 
housing credit, it cannot be definitely ascertained, as there 
were several factors, when combined,Jroved to be a restraint 
to the amount of credit actually given out. It would seem, 
however, theoretically and logically, that this may have 
affe cted the demand for housing fund. 
10. J. R. Hicks, Contribution Towards the Trade Cycle, Oxford 
at the Clarendon Press lOxford University Press), 1950 
p 152 
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INTEREST CHARGES FOR THE FIRST YEAR 
Principal ~ 4ifo 5~1..o'o ~ 6% 
$ 5 , 000 $ 200 $ 225 $ 2?5 .j~ 300 
6,000 240 2?0 330 360 
? , 000 280 315 385 420 
8 , 000 320 360 440 48 0 
9 , 000 360 405 495 540 
10 , 000 400 · 450 550 600 
11,000 440 495 605 660 
12,000 480 540 660 ?20 
13 , 000 520 585 ?15 ?80 
14 ,ooo 560 630 ??0 840 
15 ,ooo 600 6?5 8 25 900 
CRAFTER IV 
REGULATI ON X 
Regula tion X,controlling housing credit, became e f fec-
tive October 12 , 1 950 under the Defense Product ion Act of 
1 950. That part of t he Act dealing with Regulation X is 
un der Title VI of the Act a s amended in 1951. 
The Regula tion was promulgated by the Board of Govern-
ors of the Federal Reserve System at the request of the Pre-
sident. Other Government a gencies, such as the Veterans 
~dministration and Federa l Housing Administ r a tion, having 
s imila r powers over rea l esta te construction credit, a cted 
concurrently with the Board of Governors to limit t hat cred-
it over which they had controL Any changes affecting the 
Regulation were followed by s i 1nila r chan ges in t he terms of 
the credit responsible to the Veterans Administration and 
Federal Housing Administra ti on so that credit restriction s 
were uniform at a ll times . The Veterans Administration is 
responsible for credit on the l oans it gu a r antees; the Fed-
era l Housing Administra tion is responsible for credit on the 
loans it insures. 
The Regulation on housing , a s first issued, wa s to be 
impos ed or lifted at the discretion of the President. The 
basis for t he decisions would be the genera l business and 
defense conditions along wi th the 'trend in building and the 
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need f or housing . An amendment to the Defense Production 
Act, as amended in 1952, provided a formula by which the 
Federal Reserve would have the authority of applying the 
Regulation. This amendment sta ted that if housing starts 
for any three consecutive months fell below an annual r a te 
of 1. 2 million starts, the ReRUlation was to be relaxed and 
a down payment of more than 5 per cent could not be imposed 
1 
(by the Board of Governors). The amendment in no way 
relieved the President of the authority to lift the Regula-
tion if he so desired. 
Credit Reauirements: 
Regulation X reauired that purchasers make a g iven down 
payment: the amount of the down payment was to be a percent-
25 
age of the price, and the percentage increased with the price 
of the house purchased. 1 lonR with larger down payments the 
length of time for which the loan could be made , was a lso 
regulated. The percentage of t he down payment was smaller on 
lower priced houses, and the maturities a llowed were larger; 
for higher priced houses, the l a r ger down payment s and shorter 
maturities were reauired. 
Effect of Down Payment Requirements: 
The principal restriction wa s the size of the down pay-
ment which had to be a non-borrowed, ca sh down payment . This 
meant that t he fund had ~o come either from liauid assets or 
1. Se e Chapter V 
other assets of the purcha ser which could be liQuida ted. 
For a ~9,000 house, which was f airly close to the median 
price house purcha sed (both new and existing), the down 
payment wa s ;iPl, 900 for non-veterans and ~l, 000 for vet-
2 
erans (under the Veterans Administration loans). Before 
Regulation X and the a ccompanying restrictions, the down 
payment for non-veterans would have been about 13 per cent 
of thE purcha se price or about ~pl, 170. 
Veterans had enjoyed more f avorable credit terms on 
rea l estate borrowing before the Re.r;rulation. This advant-
age to veterans ~as ma inta ined by making the down payment 
requirement on veterans' loans 10 per cent less t han on 
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those to non6veterans in the price range from ~6,000 to 
$12,000 houses; on houses over $12,000, the differential 
na rrowed down to 5 per cent; for houses less than ~6,000, the 
differential was a lso 5 per cent. 
., Cash down payments on a house of ~p5 , 000 wa s 5 per cent; 
for a house over ~9.4 ,250, ~ was 45 per cent; for a ~9,000 
house, the down payment wa s 19.1 per cent. 
Effect of Maturity Requirements: 
The ma turity requirements had t heir effect t hrough t he 
size of the monthly installments. The shorter the maturity 
of the mortgage, the larger the amount tha t would have to be 
paid each month. Before Regulation X, maturities on mort-
2. See tables at the end of the Appendix to this chapter 
and also Chapter VII , for furthe r det ails on housing 
purchases and requirements. 
gages were written as long a s thirty years; after the Regu-
lation, maximum maturity for both veterans and non-veterans 
was twenty years, except for houses purchased for $'7,000 or 
less. On these, the maturity may be as much as twenty-five 
years. For veterans, however, on higher priced houses, the 
maturities might be extended up to thirty years in worthy 
cases. 
Application and Scope : 
The loans covered were those in excess of $2,500 with 
maturities of eighteen months or more whether the credit is 
for building a residence, non-residential structure or fo r 
ma jor improvements. Loans for the purchase of existing 
residential structure were also put under the Regulation. 
The restrictions, as set fort h in the Regulat ion and 
companion curbs, applied to lenders of rea l estate credit. 
The Regulation at first applied to t hose who lent three or 
more loans aggregating $25,000 in the current or preceeding 
year. This was l ater amended in the amendments effect i ve in 
1951 to apply to t hose who lent sums aggregating ~50,000 or 
more under the same conditions. 
2'7 
Those who came under the Regulation were banks, savings 
and loan associations, insurance companies, mortgage compan-
ies, loan companies, finance companies or other institutions 
or i ndividuals. All lenders had to regist er with a Federal 
Reserve Bank or branch. "Real estate credit" is credit 
secured by rea l estate for purchasing or a cquiring , repairing, 
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adding and i mproving real estate p roperty. 
The Regul ation, a s issued in October, applied to one -
and t w,o-family units . This was l ater amended to i nc lude 
three- and four-family units , multi-unit residential construc-
tion a nd non-residential construction. Non residential con-
struction loans were l imited to 5 0 per cent of the value of 
the property and twenty-five yea r maturities . Construction 
necessary for nationa l defense was pe r mitted different terms 
than .those of ot her non-residential and residential construe-
tion . 
Exemption: 
Real est ate credit on criticall y needed housing facili -
ties in defense a reas was exempted . Credit extension of states 
and municipa l gove rnement agencies was a l so exempt if it 
applied to non-re s idential construct ion . State and municipal 
public housing , however, except where gua~anteed or insure d 
by the state , did come under the Regulat ion . 
A ong with these abcve exempt ions , there were some import-
ant amendments made to the Regulation. Those who had made 
substant i a l committments or undertakings for construction , 
were abl e , if they applied before Apr il 15 , 1951, to obtain 
hardship exempt i ons from the Regul a tion. For those deprived 
of buildings by eminent doma in , credit t o pr0vig~ substitu-
t ion was exempted f'E:om the Regulation . One- t o f our-fami ly 
unit houses for sale and ' rental were ex empt from t he Regulation 
if they were part of a progr run of the Hous ing and Home 
Finance Administration in critical defense a reas . Second-
a ry borrowing by a pers on moving from one section of the 
country to another was given six months exempt ion if delayed 
in obt a i n ing the funds from a prior sale of a house . The 
maximum maturiti es on exemption-free loans was changed fr om 
thirty to thirty-six months . Funds borrowed fnr the pur-
pose of a lease were a lso exemp t. 
* * * * 
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This chapter has been a very brief abstract of the Re gu-
l a tion. The general provisions of the Regul ation are prob-
ably more i mportant than a detailed description. If greater 
famili arity with the Regulation should be desired, a more 
detailed form, which covers about every aspect, has been pro-
vided in the Appendix to this chapter . The Appendix does not 
give the Regu l ation word for wor~ as it was not felt neces-
sary as there are probably very few who are even interested 
in as complete a form as I have presented . 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 
Application of the Regulation: 
The Regulation cove rs new real estate construction 
credit; that construction which is financed through savings, 
etc. does not enter under the Regulation. Covered are pro-
perty on which a new residence , multi-unit residence, non-
residential structure is begun after twelve o'clock meridian, 
l August 3, 1950. It applies to banks, insurance companies, 
savings and loan associations, mortgage companies, finance 
companies, real estate companies and to other companie s or 
individuals who a re engaged in extending real estate credit 
aggregating $ 50,000 in the current or preceeding cale ndar 
year~ or who has extended any type of real estate credit 
listed above three times in the current or preceedinE cal-
endar year. 
Definitions: 
is: 
Real estate construction credit includes any credit wh ich 
1. wholly or partially secured by, or 
2. is for purpose of purchasing or carrying, or 
3. is for purpose of financing, or 
4. involves a right to acquire a use of new construc-
2 
tion or real property. 
This includes credit given before or after the construc-
1. Hegulation X, as amended, effective September?, 1951, 
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Board of Governors a t t .he Fe der a l He s erve System, Wash. ,D.C. 
2. tbid. 
tion is begun. The term real estate construction credit 
does not apply to loans insured or guaranteed by the Federal 
Housing Administration, Veterans Administration, or other 
3 
Federal Gove rnment agencies. 
"New construction" is any structure or major addition 
begun after twelve o'clock meridian, August 3, 1950. This 
means essential materials are affixed in a pe rmanent form 
at the site. 
Major addition includes alterations or reconstruction 
which exceeds $2,500 in value. 
"Maximum loan value" is computed in the following 
manner: 
1. For major addition to residential and non-residen-
tial structure it shall be the actual or estimated 
cost. 
2. For residential property other than major improve-
ments, it shall be: 
a. the sale price 
b. in the case of other extension: 
lb. it shall be the cost of incurred t we lve 
months previously or less. 
2b. if the cost has been incurred more t han 
twelve months previ ously, then it shall 
be the appraised value. 
3. That is why the veterans Administration and ~·ederal Hous-
ing Administration concu~rently brought out restrictions 
similar to Regulation X. 
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3. For extension of credit to finance construction 
of single unit, the value shall be: 
a. cost or estimated cost, and 
b . 5 per cent of the estimated cost. 
4. For multi-unit residential and non-residential 
property construction: 
a . in case of sale, it will be the sale price. 
b. in other oases, it will be a fair appraisal 
subject to ins pection by members for Federal 
Reserve System. 
"Multi-unit res idenoes" means structures such as apart-
ment houses or hotels containing more than four-family units. 
These are but a few of the definitions in the Regula-
tion, but those listed here are some frequently used in this 
the sis . 
Genera l Requirements and Regis~: 
1. The "scope" of the Regulation includes a person who 
is in the business of extending real estate credit 
as defined . He shall: 
a. register as required 
b. have no knowledge of any fact in which the person 
does not meet the requirements of the Regulation 
2 . All persons in the business of extending real estate 
credit as defined is considered registered until 
formal registration ~s required; after he wi ll not 
be considered so unless formal ly registered. 
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3. A registrant may be suspended after a notice if 
he fails to comply with the act. Suspension will 
end after the time limit or after application for 
such and approval. 
Extension of Credit: 
1. Except as permitted by the Regulation, no person 
may extend cre dit in connection with a sale or other-
wise if: 
a. the extension of real e state construction credit 
and the amount of credit outstanding would exceed 
the maximum loan value, or if for improvements or 
alteration, it would exceed the maximum loan value 
of these. 
b. if the ma turity value of the credit should have a 
value which exceeds the maximum value 
c. if a registrant, through discounting a rate, etc., 
extends credit which would be subject to the 
Regulation and if this amount exceeds the maximum 
loan value. 
d. if a registrant acting as principal sells new 
construction and takes in payment an indebtedness 
secured by a mortgage, and if the indebtedness 
exceeds the maximum loan value. If for a one-to 
four-unit residence this is a pplicable October 12, 
1950, for a multi unit it is applicable .January 
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12, 1951; and for a non-residential structure, 
February 15, 1951. 
Extension of credit includes both that credit 
not coming under the Regulatton and that covered 
by the Regulation; it is the sum of both of theee. 
2. Except as permitted by the Regulation, no registrant 
shall extend real estate construction credit if he 
has reason to know: 
a. that there is to be added credit (whether sub-
ject to Regulation or not) which would make the 
total greater than the maximum loan valu~, or 
b. if the added credit is subject to the Regulation 
and it does not comply with the maximum maturity 
and amortization requirements. 
3. No registrant shall extend credit unless reasonably 
sure that it will not be used for real estate con-
struction. Unless the registrant has actual know-
ledge that the credit is to be used for real estate, 
he need not follow this if: 
is 
a. the credit to be repaid within six months, or 
b. if he has had prior dealings with the individual 
and has extended credit for his business which 
is other than real estate constructton. Proof of 
this may be: 
lb. records or other transactions, or 
2b. statement by the borrower to the effect it 
is not for real estate construction. 
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4. No registrant shall extend credit unless he has 
received from the borrower: 
a. a staterrent that the credit is subject to the 
Regulation 
b. if he claims it is exempt, the reason for claim-
ing so. 
c. if not exempt, stating the amount of credit pre-
viously extended, if any. 
d. stating the basis of the estimation of cost on 
which the registrant is computing value. 
e. if the credit was for sale, the sale price and 
description of property. There is a form for 
stating these requirements put out by the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Exemptions and Exceptions: 
1. Any credit not exceeding ~2,500 is exempted from the 
Regulation. 
2. Construction credit coming under the prohibition of 
the Regulation will be exempted if the maturity is 
less than e ighteen months: however, there can be no 
provision for renewing the credit in the primary 
agreement;if the property should change hands in that 
period, then it will come unde r the provisions of the 
Regulation. 
3. The prohibitions - of t he Regulation will not apply to 
credit extended on multi-unit residences or non-
residential property having a maturity of less than 
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twenty-four months ; credit for this type construc-
tion can be given to the owner, but not exceeding 
the maximum loan value. If such property is trans-
ferred by the registrant, then it will come under 
the Re gulation. 
4 . If the credit is extended to be used for medical 
expenses, and such use is certified, then the 
restriction of the Regulation will not apply. 
5. I f the credit is to be used to replace or repair 
property damage d by floods or fire or property 
taken by reason of eminent domain, a nd the same is 
certified by the borrower, the restrictions of the 
Regulation will not apply. 
6 . Any builder or other person who ha s made substan-
tial committments or undertakings before: 
a. January 12, 1951, to build new non-residential 
structure 
b. February 15, 1951, to build new non-residential 
construction or major additions , thereto and who 
asserts that it would be a financial hardship 
on him to comply with the Regulation, may make 
appeal to the Fe deral Reserve Bank of his dis-
trict. The bank wil l review the case and if it 
feels he is justified will grant him a Certifi-
cate of Approval to enable h im to obtain credit 
fre e of the Regulation . Such applications must 
be sent to the Federal Rese rve Bank by April 15, 
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1951. 
7. Credit secured by the loan value or cash value of 
life insurance policies, is not subject to the 
Regulation; nor, does the registrant need consider 
this amount on application for further credit. 
Credit for construction or improvement of 
farm property is not subject to the Regula~on 
unless to provide residences the reon. 
8. The Regulation does not apply to new construe-
tion begun on residences prior to October 12, 1950; 
on multi-unit residences begun prior to January 
12, 1951 or on non-residential construction begun 
prior to February 15, 1851. Nor is it applicable 
to repairs or improvements made to these : 
9. Materials, articles and services used in new con-
struction are exempt from the Regulation r p oviding 
that there is a deposit of 10 per cent and are to 
4 be ~epaid within thirty months by: 
a. equal monthly or weekly payments covering prin-
cipal an d interest. 
b. equal monthly or weekly payments of principal. 
10. In the case of construction essential to the national 
defense, if such is cleared by the proper agency of 
4. By amendment of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, this was later changed to read 36 months 
rather than thirty months. 
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the government, application may be made to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of the district for a Certi-
ficate of Exemption. 
11. If a registrant desires to extend credit to a person: 
a. moving from one section of the country to 
another, and 
b. who is selling residential property, the pro-
ceeds of which are being applied to the pur-
chase of a new residential property. 
The registrant may apply t@ the Federal 
Reserve Banks of the district stating that there 
may be unavoidable delay. The Federal Reserve 
Bank may allow him to extend credit not subject 
5 
to the secondary borrowing provision. 
If the total credit exceeds the maximum 
loan value, however, that which exceeds will come 
under the Regulation. 
The loan may not have a maturity of more 
than six months. 
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12. The provisions of the Regulation as ~o secondary loans 
will not apply where the primary loan is insured or 
guaranteed in whole or in part by an agency of the 
6 United States Government: 
a. providing the total amount of the credit does 
not exceed in whole or in part the amount to 
5. Extension of credit, ~o. 2 Page 
6. Ibid. 
which the agency may commit itselr, and 
b. the department or agency approves the second-
ary loan. 
Miscellaneous Provisions: 
1. No registrant is to enter into any agreement which 
he knows is made to circumvent prohibitions of the 
Regulation. Credit is not to be divided in to two 
or more parts in order to circumvent provision on 
maturity or amortization. 
2. On outstanding obligations, where firm committments 
have been made, the registrant will not apply even 
though there be no actual undertaking ir: 
a. the firm committment on residential construc-
tion was made before October 12, 1950, 
b. the firm committment on multi-unit construc-
tion was made before January 12, 1951, 
c. the firm committment on non-residential construc-
tion made before February 15, 1951. 
d. A firm committment is a written agreement or 
agreement on which one party has taken ac~ion. 
3. Records will be maintained for thre e years after the 
extension of credit on credit that is applicable 
under the act. 
Records will be maintained by all those who are 
under the scope of the act of credit given out dur-
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ing the period the act is in force. If an indebted-
ness is sold, the buyer must maintain the records. 
The seller need maintain no records, but must main-
tain a record of the sale. Records may be inspected 
by representatives of the Federal Heserve Banks. 
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4. This Hegulation will not prevent states from accord-
ing ri ghts and preferences to veterans by extending, 
guaranteeing or insuring credit for real estate con-
struction. 'l'he terms, however, cannot be more liberal 
than those permitted under the rtegula tion. 
5. This Hegulation does not prevent states from granting, 
guaranteeing or insuring cre dit for sta te residential 
or non-residential construction. 
6. In the ca se of creitcal housing areas, the terms of 
this Regulation will be suspended or relaxed enough 
to allow the needed construction f or defense or mi li-
tary personnel. 
Schedule, One- to Four-Unit Residences; 
1. Determination of Maximum Loan value is as follows : 
a. Determine the value as provided by the Regula-
tion (Page of this chapter. 
b. Divide the value by the number of family units 
to determine the value per family unit. 
c. Determine the maximum loan value from the tables 
supplied. 
d. Multiply the maximum loan va lue per family uni t 
by the number of families and this will give the 
maximum loan value of the property or structure. 
Determination of Ma turity: 
No cre di t ca n be extended for a peri od of twenty years 
except that credit for maximum loan value per family unit of 
less than $12, 000 may be extended for t wenty-five years. 
Amortization: 
Amortization payments for property, construction, or 
major improvements must be amortized by either of t wo methods: 
1. .Annual reduction of the principle by 5 per cent until 
the amount is less than 50 per cent of the principle. 
2. Make monthly or annual payments which will reduce the 
principle periodically until it is paid off within 
the period for maturity 
Schedule for Multi-Unit Residential Property: 
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Determination of multi-unit maximum loan values shall be 
the same as the steps used in the one-to four-family residences; 
the only step which is different is that another table is used 
for the va lue per family unit. 
Ma turity and amortization provisions are the same as that 
of the one- to four-unit property. 
Non-Residential Property: 
For non-residential property, the maximum loan value will 
be 50 per cent of the proparty or major addition as determined 
according to Page of this chapter. 
Maturity: 
Credit may be extended for a period up to twenty-five 
years from the date on which the credit is granted • 
• ~ortization: 
Credit on non-residential property or construction end 
major alterations will be paid in equal monthly, quarterly 
or annually payments which will liquidate the principle and 
interest or principle before the maturity of the loan. 
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DOWN PAY1~NT SCHEDULE BY $1~000 INTERVALS 
NEW MINIMUM DOWN PAYMENTS AND M.A.XI.MUM MORTGAGE AMOUNTS UNDER 
REGULATION X AND RELATED RESIDENTIAL CREDIT RESTRICTIONS 
Maximum Mortgage Loans 
Value or Price FEL~ & Conventional Loans VA Loans 
Per Family Unit % of Value 'iP Amount 'fo of Price 1 Amount 
$ 5,000 90.0% $4,500 96.0% $ 4,800 
6,000 90.0 5,400 96.0 5,760 
7,000 90.0 6,300 96.0 5,720 
8,000 85.0 6,800 94.0 7,520 
9,000 85.0 7,650 94.0 8,460 
10,000 85.0 8,500 94.0 9,400 
11,000 80.0 8,800 92.0 10,120 
. 12,000 80.0 9,600 92.0 11,040 
13,000 76.9 10,000 86.2 11,210 
14,000 74.3 10,400 81.3 11,380 
15,000 72.0 10,800 77.0 11,550 
16,000 68.8 11,000 73.8 11,800 
17,000 65.9 11,200 70.9 12,050 
18 ,ooo 63.3 11,400 68.3 12,300 
19,000 61.1 11,600 66.1 12,550 
20,000 59.0 11,800 64.0 12,800 
21,000 56.7 11,900 61.7 12,950 
22,000 54.5 12,000 59.5 13,100 
23,000 52.6 12,100 57.6 13,250 
24,000 50.8 12,200 55.8 13,400 
24,500 50.0 12,250 55.0 13,475 
25,000 50.0 12,500 55.0 13,750 
tJ:>. 
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DOWN--PAYMENT SCHEDULE BY $ 1,000 INTERVALS 
NEW MINI:MUM DOWN PAYMENTS .A ND MAXIMUM MORTGAGE AMOUNTS UNDER 
REGULATION X AND RELATED RESIDENTIAL CREDIT RESTRICTIONS 
Minimum Down Payments 
Value or Price FHA & Conventional Loans VA Loans 
Per Family Unit - ~ or Value Dollar Amt. ~ or Price Dollar Amt . 
$ 5,000 10.0% $ 500 4.0% $ 200 
6,000 10.0 600 4.0 240 
7,000 10.0 700 4 .0 280 
8,ooo 15.0 1,200 6.0 480 
9,000 15.0 1,350 6.0 540 
10,000 15.0 1,500 6.0 600 
11,000 20.0 2,200 8.0 880 
12 ,ooo 20.0 2,400 8.0 960 
13,000 23.1 3,000 13.8 1,790 
14 ,ooo 25.7 3,600 18.7 2,620 
15,000 28.0 4,200 23.0 3,450 
16,000 31.2 5,000 26.2 4,200 
17,000 34.1 5,800 29.1 4,950 
18 ,ooo 36.7 6,600 31.7 5,700 
19,000 38.9 7,400 33.9 6,450 
20,000 41.0 8,200 36.0 7,200 
21,000 43.3 9,100 38.3 8,050 
22,000 45.5 10,000 40.5 8,900 
23,000 47.4 10,900 42.4 9,750 
24,000 49.2 11,800 44.2 10,600 
~4,500 50.0 12,250 45.0 11,025 
25,000 50.0 12,500 45.0 11,250 
~ 
~ 
If the value 
per family unit is: 
Not more than $7,000 
$ ?,ooo to $lo,ooo 
*10,000 to $12,000 
~12,000 to $15,000 
$15,000 to ~20,000 
$20,000 to $24,500 
Over $24,500 
REVISED REAL ESTATE CREDIT TERMS 
* * * * * * 
September 4, 1951 
The maximum loan per family unit is: 
Federal Housing Authority 
Conventional 
90% of value per unit 
85% of value per unit 
80% of value per unit 
~9,600 plus 40% of e~cess of 
value per unit over $12,000 
$10,800 plus 20% of excess of 
value per unit over $15,000 
~11,800 plus 10% of excess of 
value per unit over $20,000 
50% of value per unit 
Veterans Administration 
Loan 
96% of price 
94% of pr-ice 
92% of price 
$11,040 plus 1?% of excess 
of price over $12,000 
$11,550 plus 25% of excess 
of price over $ 15,000 
$12,800 plus 15% of excess 
of price over ~20,000 
55% of price 
(Continued) 
~ 
(11 
If the value 
per family unit is: 
Not more than $ ?,000 
$ ?,ooo to $10,000 
$10,000 to $12 1 000 
$12,000 to $15,000 
$ 15,000 to $20,000 
$20,000 to $24,500 
Over $24,500 
REVISED REAL ESTATE CRED IT TERMS (CONTINUED) 
* *" * *· * * September 4 , 1951 
The minimum down payment is: 
Federal Housing Authority 
Conventional Loan 
10% ot value per family unit 
15% or value per family unit 
20% of value per family unit 
$2,400 plus 60% of excess of 
value per unit over $12,000 
$4,200 plus 80% of excess of 
value per unit over $ 15 1 000 
$8,200 plus 90% of excess of 
value per unit over $20,000 
50% of value per family unit 
Veterans Administration 
Loan 
4% of price 
6% or price 
8% of price 
~~960 plus 83% or excess 
of price over $12,000 
$3,450 plus ?5% or excess 
of price over $15 1 000 
$?,200 plus 85% of excess 
of price over ~20,000 
45% of price 
~ 
0) 
REAL ESTATE CREDIT TERMS EFFECTIVE JUNE 11, 1952 
UNDER REGULATION X AND FOR LOANS I NSURED BY THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION 
If the Value Per 
Family Unit is: 
Not more than $?,000 
More than $ 7,000 but 
not more than $ 10,000 
More than $10,000 but 
not more than $15,000 
More than ~15,000 but 
not more than $ 21,000 
More than $ 21,000 but 
not more than $ 25,000 
Over ;w25,000 
One- to Four-Family Residences 
The Maximum Loan Value Per 
FamilY Unit is: 
95% of value per family unit 
$ 6,300 (i.e. 9 0% of $ 7,000) 
plus ?5% of excess of value 
per family unit over $7,000 
$8,550 plus 55% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$10,000 
$11,300 plus 45% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$15,000 
$14,000 plus 25% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$ 21,000 
60% of value per family unit 
The Minimum Down Payment 
Per Family Unit is: 
5% of value per family unit 
$ 700 (i.e. 10% of $7,000 
plus 25% of excess of value 
per family unit over $7,000 
~1,450 plus 45% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$10,000 
$3,700 plus 55% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$15,000 
$ 7,000 plus 75% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$21,000 
40% of value per family unit 
~ 
....:! 
' REAL ESTATE CREDIT TERNJS EFFECTIVE JUNE 11, 1952 
FOR HOME LOANS GUARANTEED BY THE VETERANS ADMINI STRATION 
One- to Four-Family Residences 
If the Price Per Unit is: The Minimum Down Payment Per Unit i s: 
Not more then :~ 7 ,000 Closing costs 
More tha1 $ 7,000 but not $ 280 Rlus 10% of excess of sales price 
more then $ 12,000 over ;r~ 7, 000 
More than $ 10,000 but not $ 580 Flus 16% of excess of sales price 
more t han $12,000 over ~10,000 
More than $ 12,000 but not 
more than $16,000 
$900 plus 55% of excess of transaction 
pr i ce over $12,000 
More than $16,000 but not 
more than ~~21, 000 
$3,~00 plus 57% of exce ss of transac t ion 
pri ce over $ 16,000 
More than 1 21,000 but not $ 5 ,950 plus 70% of excess of transa ction 
more than ~ 25,000 price over $ 21,000 
Over $ 25,000 35% of transection price 
~ 
CD 
REAL ESTATE CREDIT TERN~ EFFECTIVE JUNE 11, 1952 
UNDER REGULATION X AND FOR LOANS I NSURED BY THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMI NISTRATION 
If the Value Per 
Family Unit is: 
Not more than ~7,000 
More than $7,000 but not 
more than $10,000 
More than *10,000 but not 
more than $15,000 
More than $15,000 but not 
more than $20,000 
More than $20,000 but not 
more than $25,000 
Over $25,000 
Multi-Unit Residences 
The Maximum Loan Value Per 
Familv Unit is: 
90% of value per family unit 
$ 6,300 plus 55% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$7,000 
$?,950 plus 54% of excess o~ 
value per family unit over 
~10,000 
$10,650 plus 50% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
~15,000 
$13,150 plus 3?% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$20,000 
60% of value per family unit 
The Minimum Down Payment 
Per Family Unit is: 
10% of value per family unit 
$700 plus 45% of excess o~ 
value per family unit over 
~?,000 
$2,050 plus 46% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
$10,000 
$4,350 plus 50% of excess of 
va lue per family unit over 
$15,000 
$6,850 plus 63% of excess of 
value per family unit over 
~20,000 
40% of value per family unit 
tf:>. 
cO 
.... 
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CHAPTER V 
METHOD OF COMPILI~U RATES OF HOUSING 
Regulation X, being a selective control, r equired special 
administration as to imposition and operation of the regulation. 
At the time, the regulation was reissued,the economy was in one 
of the piggest building booms i n its histor~ and inflation wa s 
prominent, largely due to the influence of the building boom 
and t he Korean crisis. The primary purpose of the Regulstion 
was to curtail building and inflation, thereby making materials 
and man power available for defense construction . 
The Regulation, a s issue d by the Board of Governors, to be 
effective in October, was to be imposed by order of tlhe Pre-
s~dent, but to expire in August , 1952 . The Regu lation was aimed 
at curtailing housing starts to between 800,000 and 850,000 . 1 
Tne l evel of building actiyity and the need for houses was to 
be estimated by the President, and on this basis was the Re gula-
tion to be imposed . There was no actual formula as to when the 
Regula tion should be used a nd When it should be lifted. 
Through severa l amendments, the period of the Re gulation 
was extended and its scope increased considerably to include 
multi-unit housing and public housing. A much needed element 
in the Re gulation wa s the accurate or at least objective determi-
nation of when it ' s hould be impose d and wh en it should be lifted. 
Under Section 60? of tbe De fense Production Act Amendme nts of 
1952, a system w~s inaugura ted into the Regulation to determine 
1. This applied as mentioned above only to one- and t wo-family 
units a t t his time. 
the relaxation continuation or reimposition of restrictive 
credit controls on the basis of statistics of monthly housing 
volume. 2 The amendment provides that the Re gulation cannot 
be imposed if the seasonally adjusted rates of non-farm h ous-
ing starts for any three consecutive months fail to indica te 
1.2 mi llion dwelling units for that year . Th!s would prevent 
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the Board of Governors from requiring any down payment in excess 
of 5 per cent if the starts are below that required to enforce 
the Re gulation. The relaxation of the control could not be 
l a ter than the first da y of t he second calendar month follow-
ing this three month period. The ~ct a lso states that even 
though the level of 1.2 mil lion starts is m9intained for three 
consecuti ve months, the President could still withhold the im-
position of the Regulation, fuerefore still l a rgely vesting the 
authority in the hands of the President. 3 
The President dele gated the responsibility of obtaining 
the statistics on housing starts to the Secretary of Labor. He 
was to a cquire the fi gures, a djust them for seasona l vari a tion, 
and by this method determine the level of starts for a ny t h ree 
consecutive months . The Board of Governors ha d been dele ga te a 
the res ponsibility of dete rmining credit control po licy in con-
currence with the Housing a nd Home F inance ildmi nistra tor, using 
t h e fi gure s pre pare d by t h e Board of La bor Ct a tistics . 
The _.mendment pertai ned t o both private and ub l i c housing 
s ta rts . Be ca us e public housing is large l y dete r mined by le g is-
l a tive a ction, and a dmi n istrat ive de cision , s ea s on a l i n fluence 
3. Public Law 429 of the 8 2n d Congress De f ense Produ ction ct 
of 19 52 . 
is not al wa ys so great, a lthough there are great fluctua t i ons 
in this field . Priva~e housi ng , however, s hows a definite 
sea sonal trend in ten of the t welve years f or Wh ich monthly 
·sta tistic s are ava ilable •4 This t welve yea r re riod i ncluded 
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World Wa r II. Eve n in this war period, with its priority 
re gu l a tions, :post-war ma teria l controls a nd credit regulations, 
t he seasona l variations a re quite apparent. 
. 5 Cmmputat ion of 8ea sona l Index, Private Starts: 
In t he computa tion of t he priva te i ndex, a r a tio of star ts 
for each month to a t welve month moving average was used . The 
period used t o compute the index wa s f rom J anuary , 1940 , to 
December, 1951 . Twelve month moving averages were compute d , 
center i ng on ea c h pa rticular month in thi s pe riod . The t welve 
month moving a ve r age for a pa rticular month wa s obtained by 
t ak ing the da t a for the following : 
(a } That month 
(b) The 5 l /2 mont hs p reced ing tha t mont h . 
(c) The 5 1/2 months following t ha t month . 
•raking t his resu lt and divid i ng it by 12 gave t he moving aver-
age for t ha t month . By doing this for every month i n the 
se ries, a t we lve month moving av e r age wa s obta ined . The r a ti os 
are p lotted on the chart on Page 23 • 
The ratios f or 1942 and 1945 we re e limina ted because of 
the grea t deviations due to ext ernal fa ctors. In t he s pring 
4 . Construction Division, Boa rd of Labor St a tistics. 
5 . This informa tion was obtained from a circula r put out by 
t he Boar d of Labor St a tistic s , ~ugust 28 , 1952 . 
of 1942 , all housing was put under s Federa l permit s ystem 
i n orde r to reduce pressure on materials and man power to make 
these more readily availa ble for the larger number of housing 
units needed in defense areas. This distorted the ratio for 
1942 as a relatively large percentage of the starts a re made 
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in the spring and summer. In the fall of 1945 , due to develop-
ments assoc iated with the end of the war a nd the lifting of war-
time controls on construction materials in October, t here wa s 
a gre a t increa se in housing starts for the rest of that ye a r. 
This increa se i n starts , in the time of the year wh ich is 
~ssociated with rather l a r ge cutba cks, resulted in wipi n g out 
a ny sign of seasonal movement for t ha t year . 
In addition to eliminat ing these r a tios, the extrere ratios 
f or each month were dropped out, tha t is the highest and the 
lowest for each month were not counted. Januar y , 1946 wa s 
e xcluded beca use it wa s high, (this was due to relaxation of 
controls an d end of war mentioned above . ); the ratio for J a nuary , 
1943, wa s l ef t out a s being too low. 'rhis s ame process wa s 
follmKJed for a 11 the other mon ih s. 
The remaining ratios gave t he following indexes: 
Se a sona l I ndex of Permanent Priva te Housing Non-Far m Starts 
J a nuary ?2 ~iay 12'2 September 108 
February ?3 June 118 October 105 
Ma rch 99 July 115 November 88 
April 113 .<\ugus t 115 December ? 2 
To get tr" e annua l seasona lly adjusted r a te of priva te s tar ts for 
any month, divide the estimated private starts for that month 
by the respective seasonal index and multiply the result by 
1 2 . ~~ graph of the seasonal index as computed by the Board 
- "1 
of Labor Statistics is given on the followi ng page, .!. .J 
Accuracy of the Seasonal Index 
The seasona l index is used to assist in the interprets-
tion of the month to month movements in a time series. By 
eliminating se asona l and assuring ~11 other factors fixed, it 
is possible to compare month to month movements . By converg-
ing the seasonally ad justed monthly data to an annu~ l r a te, it 
is possible to com~are the annual rate for the current month 
with the previous year. 6 
The Board of Labor Statistics found in making comrarisons 
for any month ly data, that considerable care had to be excer-
cised to appreciate their significance. It might be that one 
of 
pa rticula r month was a n abnormal one beca use an unusua l se as-
onal or non- seasonal factor. Another considera tion v1as the 
length of the period ove r which the data wa s obtained. 'rhere 
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was a lso to be noted tha t t he va ri a t ions in the data were quite 
wide . Beca use of these fec tors, sma ll month to month move-
ments may or may not have to o much me aning . The Board of La bor 
St a ti stics, i n de riving their index , a lso computed the estima t ed 
error t o be used i n interpreting the movements. The fo llowing 
pe rce n t a ges are p lus or minus est i mat ed errors implicit in 
e a ch month l y index? 
6 . Th i s is to t ake the monthly rate a nd mul t i pl y i t by 12 , 
e ive t he year l y r a t e an d comp ar e t h i s with other yea rs. 
?. Board of Labor 3ta ti s tics, Op . Cit. 
Est i ma te d Error t o be Included 
in Seasonal Index Computation 
:; onth Error zo J.'·._onth Error ~0 J;fonth Error 'h 
Janua ry 6 . 4 ~.:ay 3 . 8 .September 4 . 3 
February 6 . 3 June 3 . 9 October 4 . 4 
Iv-arch 4 .6 July 4 . 0 r~ovember 5 . 2 
-~"9ri l 4 .1 1\ugust 4 . 0 December 6 . 4 
Computation of t h e nnua l Ra te of Fublic Hous ing .3tarts 
There a re a number of factors which must be considered 
in deriving the annua l rate of public housing starts . 
The method s hould n ot r e sult in an unrea listic rate for 
any month . Public housing i s promulga ted through l e gisla t ive 
55 
and a dministrative de cisions, an d a l arge outlay for one month 
ma y throw off' the rate for the whole year . Le gislative and 
administrative decisions limit the amount that can be con-
structed in a year. If the r a te is thrown off by a faulty 
method of es tima ting , a l a r ger number of units than t ha t 
a ctual l y provided for may be anticipa ted . It is also highly 
possible t ha t the number of units authori zed may not a ll be 
c onstructed . 
The method us ed by the Board of Labor Statis tics attemp-
8 
te d to overcorre most of the foreseeable probilems . r' hat they 
di d was t o t ake t he number of units started 111 t he current 
month (in wfuich t h ey were ) and multi pl y that number by the 
numbe r of months l eft, including the ru rren t month in tile 
8 . Ibid . 
56 
fiscal year, and a dding to this t he numbe r a lready constructed. 
If the number .was larger tha n tha t a uthori ze d for t he year, 
the authorized number wa s t h e number used; otherwise, the 
derived number was the numbe r used. This me t hod , no doubt, 
had many flaws, but it was the best t h ough t of a t that time . 
Usually , however, it the estimated number we s near or equal 
to the au thorized , it would s e em that it should be somewhat 
downg r a ded as s e ldom h a ve t h e proje cts k e p t up to t he a ntici-
pa tion schedule . This estimated number of public housing 
units is added to the number of the priva t e sector (theoreti-
cally) a nd i f the indica tions a re for any thre e consecuti v e 
months,th et t he number of units for t hat yea r will be l es s 
the n 1.2 million, then t he Re g ula tion wil l be lifted; if it 
i s more t han 1. 2 million, it may or may not be l ifted . 
The date on which decisions we re b a se d , howeve r, wa s the 
preliminary estimates. For public hous ing , the est ima tes were 
fairly current in so f a r as the me thod used goes , but f or the 
private sector, the data was about 3. 5 months behind. The 
rea son for this wa s that funds were not a vaila ble to speed u n 
the o per a tion to keep thi s fi gure up to date. Before a fina l 
de cision to i mpose o r lift the Regulation was to be made , h ow-
ever , it was de cided t o obta in the funds t o speed u p t he o pe r a -
tion , 
. 9 
s o to be ab l e to base t he de cisi on on t he cu rrent estlmates . 
The fi gure s o n which the indexes we re de rived were the 
se a sonall y adju~ted a nd non- sea sona lly ad jus ted da t a from 1939 -
1952 , on Pages 58-6.2 • 
9. Regula tion X wus lifted on September 15 , 1 952 as the annual 
r a te for June , J uly en d _\u gust of 1952 was be l ow the 1. 2 
million l e v e l. The a ccompanying curbs of the FEL~ and VA 
were a lso r e l a x ed . 
SEASONAL INDEX OF PJ!:RM.ANENT PRIV_I\Tl!: NONF~.RM HOUb i NG S'l'.8RTS 
Rati os Showing Monthly Ratios to 12 Month Moving average Ha ti OS 
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SEASONALLY ADJUSTl!;D _\ND UHAD.JU3TED ESTil'/U~'rES 
OF i'TEVJ PRI VATE !~ONFi.RM D':/ELLING UIHTS S'l' ARTED, 3Y ~fOUI'H 1939- 1952 
Un- Se i:l sona1ly Un- Se asonally Un- Seasona l ly 
r/onth adjus ted adjusted adjusted a djusted adjusted ad .jus ted 
1939 1939 1940 1940 1941 1941 
J anuary ••••• 29 , 700 41 , 300 24 ,100 33 , 500 36 , 500 50 , 700 
Februa r y •••• 29 '600 40,500 30 , 900 42 , 300 35 , 200 48 , 200 
Ma rch • •• •••• 41 , 800 42 , 200 43 , 700 44 , 100 51 , 200 51 ,?00 
.April ••••••• 41 , 900 3? ,100 52 , 400 46 , 400 61,600 54 , 500 
~!.a Y • • • • • • • • • 44 , 200 36 , 200 53 , 000 43 , 400 65 ,100 53 , 400 
June •••••• • • • 41 , 200 34 ,900 4? , 800 40 , 500 64 ,100 54 , 300 
J uly ••• • •••• 3? , 900 33 , 000 52 , 400 45 , 600 6t3 J 000 59 ,100 
.August •••••• t±2 , 800 3? , 200 51 , 200 44 , 500 61 , 200 53 , 200 
8eptember ••• 39 , 200 36 , 300 50 , 400 46 , 700 53 , 800 49 , 800 
Oc tobe r ••••• 41 , 400 39 , 400 52 , 000 49 , 500 51 , 000 48 , 60 0 
November •••• 38 , 000 43 , 200 38 , 200 43 , 400 41 J 800 4 ? , 500 
December •••• 30 , 700 42 , 600 33 , 500 4 6 ' 500 30 , 000 41,?00 
1942 1942 1943 1943 1944 1944 
January ••••• 2? , 8 00 38 , 600 9 , 300 12 , 900 12 , 200 16 ' 900 
Fe brua ry. • •• 35 , 500 48 , 600 9 , 800 13 , 400 11 , '700 16 , 000 
il~arch ••••••• 4? , ?00 48 , 200 14 ' 900 15 ,100 13 , 400 13,500 
.Apri 1 •• • •••• 42 , 000 37 , 200 15 , 200 13,500 12 , 800 11 , 300 
M.oy .......... 20,400 16 , '700 18 t 900 15 , 500 14 , '700 12 , 000 
June •••••••• 18 , ?00 15 , 800 17 ' 600 14 , 900 15 ,100 12 , 800 
Jul y •••••••• 20 , 700 18 , 000 1 6,'700 14 , 500 12 , 400 10 , 800 
August •••••• 21,600 18 , 800 19 ' 600 17 , 000 11,100 9 , 700 
September •• • 21 , 600 20 , 000 16,300 15 ,100 9 , 400 8 , ?00 
Oc tober ••••• 18 ' 100 1? , 200 18 ' 000 1? , 100 9 , 700 9 , 200 
November •••• 14 , 500 16 , 500 14 , 400 16 , 400 9 , 000 10 , 200 
December •••• 12 , 600 1'7 , 500 13 , 000 18 ' 100 '7 , 200 10 , 000 
Continued .• 
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Un- Seasonally Un- Seasonally Un- Seasonally 
adjusted sdjust ed adjusted ad,justed a djus ted adjusted 
Month 1945 1945 1946 1946 1947 1947 
January •••• 7 , 000 9 , 700 36 , 900 51, 300 38 , 200 53 , 100 
February ••• 7 , 500 10 , 300 42 , 400 58 ,100 4 2 , 600 58 , 600 
March •••••• 10 , 600 10 ,700 62 , 000 62 , 600 56 , 000 56 , 600 
April ••• • •• 12 , 400 1 1, 000 67,000 59 , 300 67 , 100 59 , 400 
Uay •••••• • • 12 , 600 10,300 87 , 100 55 , 000 72 , 900 59 , 800 
June •• • • • •• 18 , 300 15 , 500 62 , 800 53 , 200 77 , 000 65 , 300 
July ••••••• 16 , 600 14 , 400 61 , 300 53 , 300 81 ,100 70 , 500 
August ••••• 17 , 000 14,800 61 , 900 53 , 800 86 , 100 74 , 900 
September •• 20 , 100 18 , 600 57 , 600 53 , 300 93 , 500 86 , 600 
October •••• 25 , 600 24 , 400 56 , 500 53 , 800 93 , 500 89 , 000 
November •• • 29 , 300 33 , 300 47, 700 54 , 200 78 , 900 89 , 700 
December ••• : 29 ,100 40 , 400 39 , 300 54 t 600 58 , 500 8 1 , 300 
1948 1948 1949 1949 1950 1950 
January~~52 , 5oo 72 , 900 46 , 300 64 , 300 77 , 8 00 108 ,100 
February ••• 48 , 900 67 , 000 4 7 , 800 65 , 500 82 , 300 112,700 
~ar ch •••••• 76 , 300 77 , 100 65 , 300 66 , 000 11 6 , 000 117 , 200 
April ••• • •• 98 , 100 86 , 800 85 , 000 75 , 200 131, 300 116 , 200 
May •••• • ••• 99,200 81,300 91 , 200 74 , 800 145 , 700 119 , 400 
June ••••••• 96 , 600 81 , 900 91 , 000 77 ,100 143 , 400 121 , 500 
July •••••• • 93 , 700 81 , 500 92 , 700 80 , 600 139 ,700 121, 500 
Au gust ••••• 85 , 100 74 , 000 96 , 600 84 , 000 137 , 800 119,800 
September •• 80 , 500 74 , 500 100 , 600 93 , 100 116 , 100 107 , 500 
October •••• 71 , 900 68,500 101,900 97 , 000 100 , 800 96 , 000 
r:!ovember •• ., 51 , 300 69 , 700 93 , 400 :t. 06 , 000 82 , 700 94,000 
December ••• 49,400 68,600 77 , 000 106 ,900 78 , 600 109 , 200 
Continued 
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Un- Seasonally Un- Seasonally Un- Se asonally 
adjusted adjusted a djusted adjusted adjusted adjusted 
N·onth 1951 1951 1952 1952 -----
J anuary ••• 82 , 200 114 , 200 61 , 500 85 , 400 
February •• ?6 , 500 104 , 800 ?4 , 300 101,800 
l1carch ••••• 90 , 200 91 ,100 91,100 92 , 000 
Apri l ••••• 92 , 300 81 ,?0 0 9? , 000 85 ,800 
May • • ••••• 9? , 600 80 , 0 00 1/ 98 , 600 1/80 , 800 
June •••••• _90,300 ?6,500 I/99 , 200 I/84 >100 
July •••••• 8 6 j 800 ?5 , 500 1]102 , 400 I /s9 ,ooo 
August •••• · 8 8 , 300 ?6 , 800 
September . 9 5 , 300 88 , 20 0 
October ••• 88 , 900 84 , ?00 
November ,. ?2 , 200 82 , 000 
De cember •• 50 , 500 82 , 600 
ll Prelimi nary 
en 
0 
N.,.C~/BSR O"T JIIJ?., P?li~.0\::'-J~£I'!T D71~LLING UNITS STA~TED 1/ I N PUBLIC 
HOUSING PROJECTS , BY PROGR fil\~ , 1949 - 1952 
.All Federa lly u. s . Housing StC:tte C:llld 
Period programs owned E.,/ 1\ct of 1949 l ocal 
programs 
H?49: Year . •.. •..•.••. 36 , 300 3 , 900 800 31 , 600 
J~nu~ry ••••• • • • .•••• . •• 3 , 700 (3/) 0 3 , 700 
February ••••••••••••••• 2 , 600 1 JO (,1/) 100 t:; , 400 
Utirch ••• ~ •••• • ••• ••• ••• 4 ,100 200 0 3 , 900 
_l pr i 1 • ...... ...... , ..... 3 , 300 500 0 2 , 8 00 
~lay • ...... .. ............ 4 , 200 800 0 3 , 400 
:Tune .................... 4 , 500 1, 200 0 3 , 300 
Jul y ••••.... ....... .. .. 3 , 400 200 0 3 , 200 
~ugus t ••••••••••••••••• 2 , 400 800 0 1 , 600 
Septembe r •••••••••••••• 2 , 300 (E_/) 0 2 , 300 
October •••••• •••.•• •••• 2 , 400 100 0 ~ , 300 
November • • • •• •••••••••• 2 , 000 ( 3/) 500 1 , 500 
De cember •••••• •• ••••••• 1 , 400 (~/) 200 1, 200 
1950 : "'ire or •• •• •••••••• 43 ;sao -----l,ooo - 26 , 9 00 1 5 , 900 
Je nuary ••••••. •• ••• ••• • 900 (~/) 0 900 
February .•..... ...... . . 600 400 0 200 
r.r.ar ch • ••••••••••••••••• 1 ,300 ( E.l) 400 soo 
Apr i 1 • • ... . ........ . . . . 2 , 100 200 400 1,500 
Iv~ay • ............ . ....... 3 , 400 100 1 , 200 2 ,100 
,Tune •••••••••• • •.• •• ••• 900 100 100 700 
July • . ....... . ..... " .. c 4 , 700 (3/) 1 , 600 3 , 100 
August ••••••••••••••••• 4 ,100 (3/) 1 , 800 2 , 300 
September • .•••••• .•••.. . 4 , 500 100 2 , 700 1 , 700 
0 c to be r • •..•... .... ..•• 1 , ?00 ( 3/) 1, 400 300 
I~vember • • ••• •• • •• . •••• 4 , 600 ( 3/ ) &.:! , 800 1,800 
De cernber • •. .•••••• • •• • . 15 , 000 100 14 , 500 400 
Continued •• 
~ 
~ 
Period 
1951 : Year • ••• • • ••• • . 
January .... .. .... . ... . 
February • • •• • . •• . •• ..• 
~!Jarch •• •..• .• . • • ... . . . 
.~.\ pri 1 • . . ... . . .. . . .... .. . 
1t.~ 9. y • ••.• c . . ............ . 
June ••• .•.•• .. . •• ..•• • 
July .••.... . .. ... . . •. . 
August •••. ···· ~ ••••••• 
September •• • •••••••••. 
October • •••• •. ••• • •••• 
November •••• •• • •• ••.. •• 
De cember •• • • ••••• . •••• 
1952 : f i rst 6 Months . 
J~nuary •••• • •• • • •• ••• • 
Fe bruo.r·J' • . .. ... . .. .. .. . .. 
March • ... .... .. . . .. . .. . 
April . .. . .....•.• . •.. • 
l\~ay . ..•. . •• . . •• .. •. . • ., 
June • . . .. . .... ... . . ... . 
.rll l 
programs 
70 , 900 
3 , 700 
4 , 100 
3 , 600 
3 , 900 
3 , 400 
42 , 200 
3 , 400 
800 
l slOO 
~, 100 
2 , 300 
1, 300 
44 , 000 
3 , 400 
3 , 400 
1 2 , 800 
9 , 200 
8 , 4 00 
6 , 800 
Federa lly 
ovmed 2/ 
1 ~100 
400 
100 
0 
200 
100 
100 
(~) 
0 (3/ ) 
(3/ ) (3/ ) 2oo 
100 
0 
(3/ ) 
- 0 
(3/ ) 
(3/ ) 
I oo 
u. s . ~ousing 
J e t of 1949 
65 , 000 
2 , 000 
3 , 500 
3 , 300 
2 ; 400 ' 
3 , 000 
4 1 , 800 
3 , 200 
300 
1 , 100 
1, 100 
2 , 200 
1 ,100 
42 ' 100 
3 ,100 
3 , 400 
11,800 
9 , 000 
8 , 400 
6 , 400 
State t1nd 
local 
programs 
4 , 800 
1 , 300 
500 
300 
1 , 300 
300 
300 
200 
500 
0 
(3/) ( 3/ ) 
- 0 
1 , 8 00 
300 
0 
1 ' 000· 
200 
(3/ ) 
300 
1/ The concept of month of start varie s according to progr am and s ponsorship. 
Federa lly owned projects are considered to start the month of contract award. 
Projects under St ate and loca l progr ams are r epor ted t aken a s starting during 
the month a c tua l construction gegins. Projects under t he u. s. Housi ng Act of 
1949 ar e cons i dered to sta r t the month an order t o proceed i s given. 2/ Feder-
ally owne d dwe lling uni t s are those buil t with Fed era l funds f or employees a t 
governmenta l insta llations . 3/ Fewer than 50 uni t s. 4/ u. s . Housing Act of 
1937, rea ctiva ted under the .McCarthy 1\mendmen t. -
en 
N 
"PUBLIC L1\\,."; 429 OF TEE 82ND CONGRESS 
' D3FENSE PRODUCTION ACT 
AMENDMEHTS OF 1 952 ,' SECTI ON 607" 
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"Sec . 607 . Nothwiths tanding the prov1s1ons of sec t ions 602 
gnd 605 of th i s title, the aut hori ty of the President wh ich i s 
derived from said sections to im~ose credi t r e gulations r elative 
to residentia l prope rty shall not be exercised with respect to 
extensi ons of credit made during any ' period of residentia l cred-
it control relaxation', a s that term is herein defined , i n such 
manner as to impose any down payment requirement in e xcess of 5 
per centum of the transaction price . ·rhe President Rha l l cause 
to be made estimates of the number of pe r manent , nonfarm, family 
dwel l i ng uni ts , the cons truction of which ha s be en star ted dur-
ing each calenda r month and , on the bgsis of su ch estimates , he 
sha ll cause to be ma de estimate~ of the a nnua l r a te of construc -
tion starts during ea ch such month, afte r making r easonable a llow-
ance fo r seasona l varia ti ons in t he rate of construction . I f for 
any t hree consecut ive months the a nnual r ate of constr uc tion 
starts so found for each of t he thre e months fa l ls to a l evel 
below an annua l r ate of 1 , 200,000 starts per year , t he Pre sident 
shal l cause to be publi shed in the Fede r al Register an announce -
ment of the be ginning of a ' period of resident ia l credit c ontrol 
relaxa tion', which period shall begin no t l a ter than t he firs t 
day of t he se cond c a l end:ir month following such thre e conse cut ive 
months. Ea ch such r e l axa t i on period may be terminated by the 
President at a ny time af t e r t h e a nnps l r ate of co nstruction s tarts 
thereafter estimated for each of any th r e e conse cutive months 
exceeds the l eve l referred t o in the pr e cedinf. sen t ence." 
CHAPTER VI 
INFLATION AND THE BUILDING CYCLE 
In the years of 1950, 1951 and 1952 there was heavy 
spending by the Government to build up our armament , as was 
mentioned in Cahpter I. In addition to and partly because 
or this spending by the government, there were large expen-
ditures by individuals, corporations and states and munici-
palities ror residential and non-residential construction. 
Building construction is that which is be ing rererred to 
here. This spending was beirgdone in the greatest, both 
relative and absolute, booms this nation ha s ever had, the 
building industry itselr being in its greate st boom. 
The purpose of this chapter is to attemp to portray the 
role that building construction may have had in this natton-
wide boom. Building construction is ··regarded as a type of 
investment,and the industry is one or the investment indus-
tries in the economy. Some economists have concentrated on 
this particular inv~stment industry in studying cyclical 
change because of its dynamic effect throughout the rest of 
the economy. The i mportance of the studies lie in its wide 
fluctuations known as the Buildi ng liycle. 'l'his cycle is 
estimated to ave rage between fifteen and t wenty years in 
length with seventeen or eighteen years as being the accepted 
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1 
average of the cycle. 
It would seem that the Building Cycle l e ads the general 
business cycle by less than one year to four years. This 
is best illustrated in the building cycle whose peak was 
r e ached in 1925 followed by the peak of the general business 
cycle in 1928 ani 1929 . Professor Hansen has found four 
2 
building cycles since 1864. In these four cycles, one 
followed the major business cycle, one coincided with it a nd 
t wo led the major business cycle. 
The average business cycle, as a rule, is thought of as 
a nine t o ten year cycle, although with deviations from this 
l ength of time. It was found that when the building cycle 
corresponded with the business cycle either in trough or in 
peaks that the results wePe unusually severe. Thus, when a 
building cycle boom just preceded or corresponded with a busi-
ness cycle boom, there was a high degree of inflation. 
The 1918•1933 (trough to trough) building cycle was the 
last uninterrupted cycle. Since then, the cycles appear to 
be confusing as the upswing that started early in 1939 may 
we ll have given impetus to the short recovery of 1937, but 
this cycle was interrupted by the war. Its peak was reached 
in 1941 whi ch was a normal length of time for the rise. The 
recession in building which followed may have been caused by 
1. A. F. Burns & c. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1946, Pp 
418, ~19. 
2. Alvin H. Hansen , Business Cycles and National Incbme, 
w. Norton & Co. Inc., New York , 1951, P 41. 
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the regulations on credit, building materials and man power, 
imposed in World War II. ·(It would have· been curious to s ee 
if this cycle would have followed the riormel course.) The 
normal recession which sets in after a peak in the building 
cycle, did not occur because of the war and the great numbe r 
of family units created during the war and immediately af ter-
wards and also a large backlog of savings of both individual 
and corporate and the general prosperity that followed the war. 
Although there were minor slumps in this prosperity, 
the ' building cycle after 1945 was off on a record rise reach-
ing its peak in 1950. 
The following chart is an attempt to portray the build-
3 
ing picture since 1945. 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
1945 
3. 
In Billions of Dollars 
1946 194'7 194 8 1949 195 0 1951 1952 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Con-
struction, Annual Review, 1950, and other copies of 
Construction. 
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The effec·t of the wide fluctuations in the building 
industry is quite far reaching in as can be shown by the 
following: 
1. Great changes in the degree of employment in the 
industries directly and indirectly dependent on 
construction. 
2. Resulting causes for fluctuations in the rela-
tively stable consumer industries. 
3. Goods not produced when they could have been 
utilized. 
Building is the largest single investment industry in 
the United States . Significance of builmng does not stop 
with just fluctuation in that fndustry but the effect is 
multiplied through other industry directly or indirectly 
dependent upon the building industry. 
~ust to mention , lumber products industries, house-
hold industries and higher order industries producing tools 
for the use in the related industries. 
Assuming Kahn's concept of the multiplier as being 
applicable to mean both the multiple increase in income 
from a given increase in investment and the increase in 
employment from a given increase in employment in a par-
ticular investment industry, then it is theoretically pos-
sible to see the effect the building industry has upon 
our economy. It is probably impossible to compute the 
true multiplier of the ~primary increment of employment in 
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4 
the building industry; however, with this apparently strong 
influence, it may well be proposed that the building cycle 
(which as far a s I have been able to ascertain, .most econ-
omists accept) may we ll be the basis tor many or our strong-
er prosperitie s and depressions. 
The building cycle has been the source or study by 
many economists for quite sane time. That many assume it to 
be respons ible for depression and prosperit ie s lies in t wo 
5 
very prominent characteristics: 
1. It is t .h e s e cond l ar ges t single industry in the 
United Btates, second to agriculture. 
2. •rhe seve rities or its tluctu:ati'Ons are the 
greatest of any important industry in our economy. 
Those directly empl oyed in the building indus try it-
self comprise about 2,000,000 for the years, 1950, 1951 and 
1952 . uut os a l abor force of about 64 million, the build-
ing industry a lone employs over 3 pe r cent, not to mention 
the employment made possible in the rela t ed industries . 
The value of new construction makes up a n even more 
impressive figure. The viklue or new building construction 
has been abcut 22 bi llion dollars annually for 1950, 1951 
and 1952 . 'i'his is the equiva l ent or about 8 per cent o r the 
gro ss national income . 
The magnitudes of t he i;luctuation are l a r ge l y caused 
4 . Cl a r ence JJ. Long, J"r ., Building IJycles and the Theory 
ot Investment , Princeton University ~ress, 1940. 
5 . Ibid . 
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by the slowness of undertaking and curtailing building activ-
ity. Residential construction has the greatest fluctuation 
6 
percentage wise. One reason for this is that a considerable 
portion of residential construction is done by speculators. 
Builders imbued with optimism (once they have started to pro-
duce) overestimate demand because the effective demand is not 
always equivalent to expectation. 
A second explanation is that home builders have less 
foresight than non-residential buyers and tend to under-
estimate pertinent economic factors. Residential builders 
are also overpessimistic in depression. The pessimism in 
depression and the optimism in prosperity is the cause of the 
wide fluctuation. 
Public and business construction are both of about t he 
69 
same intensity in that these do not fluctuate so widely largely 
because there is less speculation by business and less fear 
of the future in the non-speculative building, such as public 
building done according to the need or such as is determined 
by the legislatures concerned. Private resident and non-
residential construction has be en on a steady increase until 
1951, when, due to Regulation X, it fell off somewhat and is 
now at this time decreasing in number of units. 
We have noted that p rivate and public building in the 
6. Ibid. 
years 1950, 1951 and 1952 average about $22 billion alone. 
This is a type of new investment and as suchbas a multi-
plier and accellerator effect. 
The Multiplier Effect of Building Investment: 
We have in the building cycle an example of sustained 
investment. The investrrent is not constant, however. At 
the be ginning of the rise on recovery the primary investment 
may be small. The building force, must be built up and 
e quipment procurre d . These conditions prevailed in 1944 and 
1945. The building industry was not depressed in t ha t there 
was no demand for building, but tha t much building ha d not 
been undertaken because of the restrictions during the war. 
As the industry is built up and skilled l a bor recruited, tools 
procurred and more w~ terials became available , the ac t ivity 
increa ses. 
The following are the f igures, a s closely as the writer 
could ascertain, for pr ivate and pub lic building construction 
? 
f or the years 194& to 1951. 
Expenditure for New Building Construc ·tion 
In Millions of Dollars 
Total New 1946 194? 1948 1949 1950 1951 
Construction 8 940 11650 15200 15310 20910 21990 
Priva te 8210 10850 13?50 12980 181?0 1?930 
Public ?30 800 1450 2330 2?50 40?0 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Washing-
ton, n. c., New Construction,"Expenditure s for 1 9l5.-1951. 
These figures may contain some error. The fi gures given 
are those strictg for building expenditure. Many bu ild-
?0 
With these given values for building construction by 
appl ying to them the multiplier, it can be shown .just wha t 
the influence building construction had upon the gr oss 
Na t ional product . This estimate is by no means put forth 
as the exact value of the building influence; it is onl y 
an approximate figure . 
Year 
1946 
194? 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
CHANGE I N INCOME FROM BUILDING INVESTNilll~T 
REAL & MONETARY VALUE 
8 
I N BILLIONS OF DOLL1ffiS 
Building 
Investment Change in Change in Change in 
Constant Real Real Income 
Dollar Consum:12tion Inccme Monel 
5.25 
-----
5.25 8.94 
5 . 75 4 . 20 9.95 18 . 73 
6.83 7.95 14.78 28 . 59 
7 . 00 11.80 19.80 35.69 
9.37 15.83 25.20 49.51 
8 . 76 21 .70 30.46 63.39 
.A lag of one year was taken as J. R. Hicks felt that 
this wa s a :proper lag for the consum.pt ion functi on in t h e 
9 
United States. 
The direct and indirect effects of building investment 
?1 
are not fully portrayed here. There has not been any attempt to 
(cont . ) ing expendituxes may not be included as a break-
down of figures, for example of military expenditures was 
not available . That part which was for port facilities , 
8. 
9. 
air bases, etc . was indistinguishable from that used for 
warehouses, barracks, etc. T~e same applies for public 
utilities as no distinction could ·be made between wate r 
pipe laid and constructi on of pumping stations . 
These are the deflated value of buil ding investment given 
on Page 7 0 . They were derived from the Sur.Y-~.X- of Current·-
J . R. Hicks, A Contribution to the Theory or Trade. GY.~le, 
Oxford University Clarendon Press, 1950 , P 22 . 
portray the accelerator effect, yet, in 1951 building con-
struction was directly or i ndirectly responsible for ~63 . 4 
billion of a Gross Nationa l Product of just over ~p329 billion. 
It is not cla imed he re that building construction was 
the only nor the most i mportant type · of inves tment being 
undertaken at this time. There were l arge outla ys i n pro-
du cer tools, the ave rage for the years 1949-1951 be i ng ~~ 2 1 
billion; business inventories rose by $.5 . 5 billion and ~10.3 
9 
billion for the years 1950 and 1951 respectively. There 
were new fie lds of investme nt that were opening up or old 
fields that we re offering new sources of investment; for 
example, the re wa s a grea t expansion in the gas transmission 
fields. Road building a lso underwent a boom as t he run-down 
r oads had to be repa ired and en l a r ged to accompa ny ' the ever 
increa sing flow of motor vehicle traffic. All the s0 f orces 
contributed grea tly to na tional income and should not be 
neglected , but the purpose he re has been to study t he influ-
ence of building investment in the post-war years. 
With the incre a s ing amounts of building inves tmen t ma de 
in the post-war years, and especia lly that around 1948, 1 949 
and 1950 , it can well be seen why this is one sector of the 
e conomy where restrictions on investments (through cfedit cur-
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8 . (Cont.) Business , Vol. 28, No. 7, July , 1949 and Vol . 32, 
No. 7, July, 1952 . The value for the defla tor was obtained 
from the July, 1952 issue, Page 28 . To the column for 
change in consumption the consumption defla tor wa s used in 
arriving at the value for cha nge s inmmey income so that 
chan ge in income is equal to the increase in Qonsumption 
multiplied by the consumption deflator plus tile building 
investment multipli ed by the construction deflator . 
££• cit. Survev of Current Bus i ness, July, 1952. 
t ailment) are quite ne cessar y. Had the amount of bu ilding 
tha t wa s desired b y individuals been allowed, the i nf l a tion 
pressure of this plus the gove rnment spending mi ght well 
have been disa strous. This is complete l y a side from the 
e ffe cts of materia l shortages and the higher prices that 
unlimite d credit would have brought. 
?3 
APPENDI X TO CHAPTER VI 
The derivation of the multiplier is presented here more 
as a point of interest and to indicate the method by which 
it was derived. 
Determination of the Multiplier: 
A multiplier with a value of five was arrived at by tak-
ing the figures given in the July, 1952 issue of the Survey 
of Current Business . The years , 19~6 to 1951 were used as 
it was felt that before that the consumption function might 
not have been entirely by voluntary actions. 
The value s were deflated in terms of 1939 dollars and 
because of this t hey are not exact; however, according to 
the Survey of Current Business the difference is "negligi-
ble." 
The values for parts o~ the national income are as fol-
lows: 
Year 1946 194? 1948 1949 1950 1951 
PDI 103.3 101.1 106.1 10?.6 114.1 11?. 
c 95.? 98.3 100.3 103.2 108 .5 108 . 4 
s ?.6 2.8 5.8 4 . 4 5.6 8 . 6 
Where PDI is Personal Disposable Income • c is Consumption and 
S is Savings . By plotting these va lues and fitting a trend 
line (free-hand fit) a Marginal Fropensity to consume of . 8 
10 
was obta ined . 
10. c. Cohen, Review of Economics and Statistics, Harvard 
Univer s ity Press, November, 1952, P . 18. From figures 
from the same organiza tion, Department of Comme rce , 
Cohen a lso plotted a trend line which when superimposed 
upon the one derived here gave an exact fit. 
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The graph is shown on the following page . The relationship 
as expressed by most economist s a nd Cohen is between the 
11 
Persona l Dispos able Income and Consumpti on. 
11. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER :VII 
ln RST S I X M.ON'I'HS U}j'TJl R REGULJ,TI ON X 
Re gulation X was issued October 12, 1950 , by the Board 
of Governors in concurrence with the Housing and Home Finance 
Administrator stipulating minimum down payments and maximum 
maturi ties on one- and t wo-family units or new construction; 
and the Federal Housing Administration and the Veter ans .Admin-
istration , through the Housing and Home Finance Administrator, 
tightened the terms of insured and guaranteed mortgages on 
both new and existing houses . At this time , housing credit 
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was ti ghtened to affect only sing le - and double - unit construc -
tion ; it did not pertain to multi-unit construction , plant con-
struction , additions to present structure, and repairs . 
This chapter wi l l a ttempt to deal with changes that took 
place in the first six months after t he Regulation wa s imposed . 
Terms on the Federe l Housing Administration and Veterans Admin-
istra tion insured and guaranteed mortgages were ti gh tened s ome -
wh a t , effective .TulJr 19, 1950 , when the President aske d for 
credit restri ction ; however , the period discussed in t h is chap-
ter pertains to the s i x months following the reissuance of Regu-
l a tion X. The comparison period is the eighteen months prior 
to the reimposition of the Regulation . One change t hat became 
qu i te noticeable in the e arly pe riod of credit restriction was 
the increa sing importance in the real estate market of e xisting 
houses relative to new houses ;- that is , the number of e x isting 
houses that v1ere -purchased in r el ation to new houses being con-
structed. ~ven before the restriction became effective , there 
had been an increase in the real estate market for existing 
houses . In 1950 , there had been a tremendous volume of new con-
struction; this wa s accompanied by an increas ing proportion of 
new housing transferes a s compa red wi th pre ceding years . With 
the Korean crisis and the coming of controls , ther e wa s a shift 
towards pur chasing existing houses . In the last months of 1950 
and the first months of 1951 , the pur chase ratio of existing to 
new houses changed from 1.3 to 1, in the pre-regulat ion period , 
to 1 . 5 to 1 in tbe first si x months following t he reissuance of 
Regulation X. 
?5 
The increased importance of existing houses, it would seem, 
wa s due largely to the outbreak of hos t i lities in Korea , the 
climate of inflationary pressure and control measures, and the 
greater uncertainty which the climate create d . Potential buyers 
who were wa iting for a price decl i ne or more favorable bor rowing 
t erms wer e stimulated int o a cti on. The pr ices of buildi ng mate-
rials increased , an d i t appea red that they mi gh t continue to do 
so . Prices of new houses rose substantially ove r t hose of exist-
ing houses deflecti ng some of the demand to tbe l atter . Many of 
the new houses were available at the time, but were not completed. 
These were being sold on the basis of a completed model ith a n 
escalator provision for higher costs if they were incurred ; this 
probably made many cautious. 
Another factor affecting t he purchase of new houses was that 
many wh o were r ent i ng had r ecollections of the rent situation in 
? 6 
the previous period of mobilization and felt that buying might 
be less ex9ensive. This was verified by data of a trend away 
f rom r enting and more home ownership . 
The Regulation , issued in October , dealt primarily with new 
housing rather than existing housing , and resulted in a modera -
tion of an advantage previously available in new house financing . 
It made credit on all ne w houses Federally regulated . 
The means of financing real estate credit showed a change 
from that used before t he Tiegulation . There was an increase in 
the use of liquid assets . Approximately 80 per cent of the pur-
chasers used liquid a s sets after the Regulation as compared with 
60 per cent of the purchasers in the pre-regulation period . 
The following breakdown may indicate some of the changes and 
sources of funds for house financing: 
Sources of Rea l Estate Finance in 
Pre- and Early-Regula tion Period l. 
tPercentage of House Purchases Using Specified Source of 
Funds i n the Given Periods. ) 
Source of Funds 
First Mortgage 
Second r~:ortgage 
Other Borrowing 
Liquid Assets 
Sale of House 
Other Sources 
Pre - Regulation 
Period 
84 
Not .Ava i l ·able 
14 
61 
34 
5 
Early- Regulation 
Period 
83 
? 
16 
83 
2? 
3 
1. Taken from Federal Reserve Bulletin , july , 1951 . Page 5 
?? 
Thi s shift towards more liQuid as sets i s e xplained by t he 
fa c t that a s maller portion of uurcha s e rs bo rrowe d the f u l l 
pri ce of the hous e . I n the pre - r egulGti on pe ri od , one purchaser 
in ni ne bo rrowed the ful l value ; after the .Hegu l a tion, tr1is pro-
portion droppe d to one in fi fty . This was mDstly because t h e 
Veterans Administr a tion re gulations eliminated 100 pe r ce nt loans , 
requiring an i ni ti a l equity of the purchaser in any house pur -
chased involving guarantee d mortgage cre dit. l1bout one i n ihree 
i n t he pre - regu l a ti on period, as compa re ~ with one in four in 
t he l s tter pe riod, sold a h ouse jus t prior to their purchese . 
Although construction c osts during t he f i rst six months of 
t he r egul ation p e ri od rose shar p l y , relat i ve to the pre-re gula -
t ion per i od , t here we re only sl ight diffe rences i n t he pr ice 
distribution ~nd me~ ian pri ce house of both ne w and existing 
houses i n t he pre~regulation and early-regulation period . The 
median price for new houses rose from :;,9 , 960 to C;l0 , 400 , <::lnd the 
price for existing houses was a t ~9 , 000 for both periods . 
Pri ces F3 i d for Houses in 
Pre - and Early- n e gulati on Period 2 . 
Percentage Distribu tion 
Pre - Regul a tion Price Esrl~-Resulation 
New Existi ng :New J:xistin~ 
1 3 Under .. ~ E , 500 2 5 
5 1 5 ~2 , 500 - :~4 , 999 3 14 
13 19 5 , 000 ? , 499 12 19 
31 22 7 , 500 - 9 , 999 27 19 
22 16 10 , 000 - 1 2 , 499 32 1? 
10 11 12 , 500 - 14 , 999 8 12 
10 7 15,00v - 19 , 999 8 10 
8 ? 80 ~ 000 "=" Over 8 4 
100 100 100 100 
· ~ (9 ' 000 r.·~ed ian Price ~10 , 400 ~~9 ' 000 :j,>9 ' 960 -
2 . Federal He serve Bul le tin , op . cit . 
?8 
One of the explanations why the cost of new housing i ncre a sed 
more than did the cost of e xisting housing was that there wa s 
relative stability in the money income of pur cha sers . I ncomes 
rose for the popul a tion, but the distribut ion remained about the 
same . 
Prices of the median hous es in the pre-regulation pe riod 
and the ear ly- re gula tion period we re about the same , a nd the per-
centage distribution r an about the same for most price classes . 
This , however , should not hide the fact that the price of a house , 
if g iven specifi ca tions , rose considerab l y , very clo se to the 
r ise in cos t of' materials and l abor . I n the early-regulation 
per iod , houses of a given price did not meet the specifica tions 
for that same price house in the pre- regulati on period. 
The fact that incorre distribution of those purchasing houses 
cha nged little indicates that a larger proporti on of the pur -
chasers were in the l ower income cla sses . As there is a fair l y 
close relationship between income and price of houses purchased , 
it would seem tl~t more of the house s we r e designed for sale to 
l owe r income gr oups . Buyers may a lso have downgraded the size 
or qual i ty of their homes . 
House Purchasers 
One of the most influential factors in the purchase of hous-
ing is the income of purchasers . As a c l ass , the housing pur -
chasers in·· the early- regulation period had incomes higher tha n 
those of home owners and non-purchasers for the pre- regulation 
per i od . 3 • 
3 . Income 
income 
of the 
About ?0 pe r cent of the purch a sers had incomes 
i s the money income before taxes ; this includes 
of the family unit , but is usual l y equa l to the 
purchaser . 
of 
t o t. a l 
income 
$3,000 to $ 7,500 in 1950. This compares with 50 per ce nt for 
non-house purcha sers for that period . 4· 
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In t he s ix months fol l owing the regulation , there was a 
grea ter concentration of purchases of new houses in t he ~7 , 500 to 
$ 12,500 price range, and en even greater proportion of purchases 
of existing housing below tha t range. As a result, the median 
price of' new housing was 15 per cent higher than tha t of existing 
housing . 5 • This difference in price is associated with a differ-
ence in income distribution of purchases of new and existing 
houses . 6 • 
Price of Rouses Purchased by I ncome Group 7 • 
Early-Regulation Period 
Percentage Distribution 
Pri ce of House 
Under 7500 
7500 - 9999 
10,000- 12,499 
12,500 - Over 
Under 2000 
2000 to 
2999 
46 63 
14 22 
12 7 
8 8 
100 100 
Income of 
3000 4000 
to to 
3999 4999 
43 21 
27 26 
19 34 
11 19 
100 100 
Purchaser 
5000 7500 
to to 
7499 9999 
14 7 
19 10 
28 19 
39 64 
100 100 
Persons having incomes of less than $3 , 000 purchased 25 
of the existing houses and about 14 per cent of the new 
10,000 
Over 
5 
12 
4 
79 
100 
per cent 
houses . 
Income classes of $3 , 000 to ~7,500, however, purcha sed a bout 70 
per cent of the ne w houses and about 65 per cent of the existing 
houses . 
It is expected th~t there be a relationsh i p between the 
4 . Board of Gove rnors Survey of Consumer- ·, ·Finance, 1950 a nd 1951 
Federal Reserve Bulletin , op,cit. 
5 . Ibid . 
6 . Ibid. 
7. Federal Reserve Bulletin, op.cit . Page 8 
income of the purch a ser and 'the price of the house purchased . 
The price-income ratio runs between 2 .3 and 2.7 f or i ncomes 
of less than .;1 0,000 . In the uppe r price houses , the ratio 
is about 2.5 to 2 .7 or 2 . 8; whera~s , in the lower r.ri ce houses , 
it has bee n running a s low a s 2 . or 2 .1 to about 2.4 .8 
There is another fa ctor to be considere d a side from the 
relationship of inco rre to the house purchased. It i s , the 
size of mortgages and their ava ilability to various incom~s. 
The income of the purchaser will largely affect his savings, 
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as a rule, wh ich are often times the source of the down payment , 
especiall y f or lower income groups. The l ower the i ncome cl ~ ss, 
the f ewer are the assets, other than savings , that he can turn 
into ready cash. It is t he amount of the mortgage with interest 
and maturity which de termines the monthly insta llment payments . 
The Regulation has a ctually s hortene d the leng th of maturitie s 
on the higher price housing , making l arger the monthly payment. 
Sources of Funds Among Income Groups 
Sources of funds in t he early- re gulation pe riod unde r went 
v~rious changes . The major diffe rence was the decrease in use 
of the first mor t gages and liquid assets and the greater use of 
borrowing , no t involving a mortgage by the l ower income groups . 
About 84 per cent of those having incomes of :~ 3 , 000 or more used 
first mortgage s; whereas , those having incomes under ~3,000 used 
other means . Genera lly , the hi ~her the income group , the greater 
was the use of first mortgages and liquid assets . Liquid a s sets 
8 . Ne w Housing in Metropolitan Areas, 1949- 51 . United States 
Department of Labor, Bur eau of Labor Statisti c s . 
• 
were the next i n rank for use by the hi gher income groups . 
Those who were in lower income groups used first mortgages 
alqng with unsecured borrowing . Most unsecured borrowing wa s 
used for the l Arger down payment require d under the Regula-
tion. 
Lo·.ver rates, longe r maturities and h i gher price - mort-
gage ratios were available for those who had a guarantee or 
insurance on their mortga ge . Under the Veterans Administra-
tion or Federa l Housing ..:\dministration these mortgages carr ied 
rates below 5 pe r cent while 65 pe r cent of the conventiona l 
mortgage s carried rates of 5 per cent or more . Ei ghty per 
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cent of the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans drnin-
istration mortgages were able to obtain twenty or longer maturi-
ties as compared with a bout 25 per cent of the conventional 
mortgages obtaining these terms . Thirty- seven per cent of the 
conventional mortgages , a s compared with 8? per cent of the 
Vete rans Administration mor t gages and 68 per cent of the Federal 
Housing Administration mortgages, were underwritten with a price-
mortgage ratio of 65 pe r cent or better. 
Under t he Regula tion, th e actual maturities allowed on 
l ower price housing were longer than those on high price hous-
ing ; a s a rule , however, these longe r ma turities were not pos-
sible to obtain . This ruling was based on the expectationthat 
those purchasing houses in the $? , 000 or under class had con-
siderably lower incomes than those purchasing houses over this 
amount . It was found that the lower income group was a sked to 
pay a higher interest rate , probably as an insurance, than ·w.as . 
the higher income group. 
Non-guaran tee d and non-insured (conventional) mortgages 
were more fre quently used by relatively lower and relatively 
higher income groups . The large class in the middle group t 
who had the insured or guaranteed loans, were l argely veter-
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ans, however . Although most in the higher income group didn' t 
obtain Veterans _>idministration or F'ederol Housing l\drninis tration 
assistance, they were a ble to obtain lower rates because of their 
income position. 
Loan to price ratios were higher for lower income groups 
than for higher income groups. This was because of the greater 
marketability of l ower pri ce housing and because of the greater 
loan to price ratio requested . For the opposite reasons , the 
l oan to pri ce r at i o for the higher income groups wa s lower. In 
t he middle income groups, it was also relatively high because 
of the insu re d and guaranteed a spects of the ir loans. ( These 
were largely veteran's loans.) 
The re1a tion of income to monthl y payments was close e x cept 
far a . fair l y l ar ge group of lower income people . The reason 
for this mi ght be that the combine d income of these fami l y units 
made possible l arger monthly insta llments; a nd also , it might 
have been t hat many of these l ow income purchasers would be in 
l ow income groups only temporari l y . 
House Purcha ses of Veterans 
Vetera ns in the e a rly regula tion period ac counted for one-
ha lf of al l existing houses and more than half of new houses 
purcha s ed . Thi s is explained by t he l a r ge number of veterans 
• 
' 
8 3 
and by t he Governmenta l aid i n t h e f orm of Veterans Admini str a -
tion guarantees on their l oans . In the pre-regul at ion period , 
they playe d almost as big a part in 't he total r ea l esta te mar-
ket as the y did i n the pre - re gula t ion period. 
The median price o f houses purcha sed by veterans and non-
ve tera ns was nearly the s ame . However , t he r elatively lower 
and h i gher priced houses were purcha sed by the non- veterans . 
!Jon- veterans were affected considerably by the larger down - pay-
ments and the shorter maturities required by the Regul ation . 
The l onger ma t uri ties allowed , under the Regu l a tion , for l ower 
priced houses , were not written i n by the banks be ca use these 
houses we re purchased by lower income groups . 
Veterans made a greater us e of first mortgages a nd less 
use of funds from sa le s of house s than did non- vetera ns . This , 
again , is due to more favora ble f inanc ing and also the fact 
that fewer had houses to sell . About 16 per cent of the vet-
erans and non- veterans used funds other than first mortgages . 
On t he whole , veterans had conside r ably mone f avorab le terms 
due to the a id of the Government in the Veterans . .;.dministration 
guar a r.tee and Federa l Hous i ng Administration i nsurance . 
Occupa t ional Groups 
The representation of occupationa l groups in the pur cha se 
of housing in the earl~r regul a tion period wa s co nsis tent with 
their repr esentation in the popu l a tion. The mos t important group 
in house purchases wa s skilled and semi- skille~ workers who pur-
cha sed a lmos t 40 pe r cent ofthe housing . The price paid 
f or housing by t he se g roups followed pret t y we ll the dif-
fe rences i n i n co me . 
Mort gages we r e use d most fre quent l:r b y nrofessiona l a nd 
se~i -professiona l gr oups , o nd t he cleri c a l 8 nd sa les f,roup . 
Retired purch~ sers used mort gages the l eas t . Only about 30 
per cent of t he re tire d ~roup purchas ing houses used this 
method of finti ncing; whereas , 9 0 pf:j r- cent of the p r ofessional , 
semi - professiona l, cle rica l GnC sales gr oups u sed mortgage s . 
_\l though t he professiona l anl semf - p r ofessiona l t:r oups had sma ll 
assets , because of re l at ively high incomes they were able t o 
obt~in favorable t erms . The retired group had a ssets hich 
.ere readily e nough turned int o ca sh , a nd a lso much of their 
fin~ncinG wa s done throu01 tha s a l e of houses . Pro fessional 
group s :ith h i ghe r i ncomes , who resorted to guarant eed and 
insured mortgages, bought t h e mor e expe nsive h ousing . This l ee 
t o re l at ive l y lo Yer rates and longe r maturitie s , (no g reated 
than that a llowe c under t he Regul~tion , however) . 
The illanageri a l and se lf -em~loyed group , wbi ch a lso had 
rel atively l a r ger income s , used t he conventiona l mortga ges , 
a lt hough insured mortgages were a lso common for t h is group . 
Th is g r oup had about t he s a me chara cte ris t ics as a ll other pur-
chasers; eY-cept t hey had a rela tively low mor tgage - price ratio . 
The cle rica l and~les gr oup , containing a l a rg<:: r number of 
vete r ans , mor e fre quently f inance d thei r purcha se s wi th guar -
anteed and insured ~oans . This g roup b ough t more e xpens ive 
house s t han those of othe r gr ou ps for the same i ncome l e v e l . 
The re ason for this was t ha t t hey had 1:1 greater expec ta tion of 
8 4 
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advancement 3.nd also Veterans .Administration and Fe der al !-:ous-
ing dministra tion assistance . Thi s group had low rates , 
l onger maturities and about average l oan to ::;rice ratio . 
Unski l l ed and service workers usee r elb tively few Fe dera l 
Fousing Administration or Vetera ns .Administr a tion mortgages . 
Because of this and t h e l ow i ncome factor , the y purcha sed low 
price houses . They had higher rates , shorter ma turities , and 
below avera ge loa n- price ratios . 
Characteristics of House Purchases 
It was found tha t the median price of e x i s ting houses wa s 
~9 , 000 and that of new pouses was :,!'10 , 400 in t he early re gula-
tion period . This wo u ld indicate a di fference in price between 
these t wo medians of about 15 per cent . Because of h i gher 
costs of new housing , the seeking of bette r neighborhoods and 
other factors , i t would seem tha t t here wo uld be a greater dif-
f e r ence than t h is . The most proba ble explanation might be , how-
ever , t hat the greater down payment requirements and the shorter 
ma turities stipulated under the Regul ation caused an actu a l 
s hift to l ower qua lity and smaller nouses . 
For a g i ven pri ce house , t he qua lity of f i x tures wa s down-
graded i n the early regul ation period as compared with the pre -
regul ati on period . The size of t he houses showed a discernible 
shift a lso . This was due to the fa c t t hat more medi an and l owe r 
pr i ce houses were built be cause of the more favorable terrr-s 
available to t he purchasers of these houses under t he Veterans 
Admini~tration and Federal Hous ing F-dminis tration administered 
loans . This change wa s much more noticeable in metropolitan 
areas than in non- metropolitan areas where incomes, construc-
tion costs, and land values were lower. 
It was estimated that 85 per cent of al l house purchases 
were mortgage fina nced; however, th i s pertained to houses over 
$ 5 , 000 more than those under ~5 , 000. Twenty- five per cent of 
all houses unde r ~p5 , 000 had some other type of financing . 
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There was a close relationship between t he price of houses 
purchased and the source of funds, probably reflecting the rela-
tionship of price to inc ome and income to source of funds . The 
higher the price , the more frequently was tile financing derived 
from prior sale . This sane relationship applied to liquid 
assets also . 
Again , the relationship of price to type of financing wa s 
apparent . The highe r J:rice gr oups , ~15 , 000 emd over , and the 
lower price e roups , ~5 , 000 an d under, used conventional mort -
gages about ?5 per cent of the time ; whereas , t hose of the me-
dian prices used Veterans ~dministration and Federal Housing 
Administrat ion guaranteed or insured mortgages . About 68 per 
cent of the median eroup used conventj onally financed mortgages . 
Chara cteristics a s to rates and maturities followed that of 
income t o price ratio for the higher :pr-ice houses and also for 
the me dia n class be cause of the Governmental assistance. Maturi -
ties on lower price )louses foll wed the 1rendt' On lower incomes , 
namely , shorter maturities , considerably shorter as a rule, than 
al lowed unde r the Regula t~on . :rtortgage to price ratio followed 
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the observed trend on the price of houses . Only 7 pe r cent of 
houses over ) 7,500 had an 80 per cent price- to mortgage ratio. 
The high9r t he price of the house, the less was the ratio o f 
mortgage to price. In the upper bracke ts, this is readily 
e x plained by the Regulation re quirements of large r down pay -
me nts . In the lower bra ckets, higher mortga ge to price r a tios 
were a llowed for the reasons g iven a bove, namely, greater ma r-
ketability of lower priced houses. 'rhe means of financing new 
and existing houses in the pre-regulation and early-regulation 
pe riod followed the s ame trend. This is due to the l a ck of any 
great difference in price . Financing of houses in metropolita n 
and non-metropolitan a reas diffe red considera bly . Thi s was 
because of the l ower price houses and lower incomes i n non-metro-
politan a r eas . Anothe r fa ctor was the e a sier a ccommodation pos-
sible i n metropolitan a reas . The price to income , pri ce to mort-
gage, and mortgage to income ratios followed cona~ stently in non-
me tropolitan areas as described above . One of t he ma jor differ-
ences , however, wa s the monthly payments . In t he non-metropoli-
tan di stri cts, where the lower income and lower price houses 
were sold,(both new a nd existing ), monthly p ayme nts were l a r ger. 
~nother difference was t he lower money rate s a nd longer maturi-
ties i n me tropoli tan distri cts a s compared with the non- metro-
polita n a rea s . This , aga in, is exp l a ined by the lower incomes 
and lower price houses more common in the non-me tropolita~ a reas . 
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Summar y 
I n summa r y , it would a ppear t ha t exis ting houses were more 
important i n t he re a l estate market fol l owing the issuan ce of 
Regulation X and t11e ac companying Feder a l Housing Adminis tra-
tion and Ve terans ~dministration regul ations than in the ei gh t -
e en month~ period pr ior to the issuance of the Re gu l ation . This 
s hift was accounted for by the many controls an d the higher cost 
of bui l ding materials. It wou l d al so ap pe ar that although th e 
media n price_ of houses wn s a bout t he same , the Qua l ity of houses 
we s l ower . The assistance of the Federa l Housipg Administratmon 
and Veterans ~ dministration programs apparently accounted for 
more than ha l f of the pur c hase s in the pre- and early- regulation 
period . 
The informa tion f or this ch ap~er wa s obtained l a r gely from 
a survey done by National Analysts , I nc. for the Board of Gov-
e rnors of t he Federal Rese rve System. The r e su l ts we r e print ed 
i n the Federal Reserve Bulletin for J uly , 1951 . Suppl errenti. ng 
t h is source were specia l reports pertaining to this survey given 
out by the Federal Reserve System . The r est of the information 
wa s obtained f r om issues of the Department of La bor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics . These we re special monthly and week l y re por ts; 
Construct i on , .Annual Review , 1950 ; New Housing in .Metropolitan 
Areas , 1949- 51; and a mont hl y periodical , Construction. 
It had been intende d to continue a study similar to t he 
above for the entire pe riod of the Regul ation , but the terms 
of purcha se remained so near l y the same tha t a further r epor·t 
was unnecessary . The trend seems to have he ld t hroughout the 
period . 
The reason the trend was so constant was probably that 
by the e nd of the study . the Re gulation had taken hold in 
the residential field a nd t u e trend was fairly well set. 
There were some change s in that the number of Regulation-
free houses became fewer and fewer, and there was a very slight 
tendency to continue renting ro ther than try to bu y aft er it 
was seen t ha t rent controls would still be in effect to some 
ext ent . Othe r than the se and othe r minor changes , the pattern 
set in the first six months, continued for most of the Regu-
la ti on pe riod. 
9. The ori ginal study done for the Federal Re serve System 
cove red only a five-month period. For the purpose of 
this chapter, additional findings were included for 
March to extend the study to a six-months period to in-
clude the end of March, 1951. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
REGULATION X IN OPERATION 
The Korean invasion by the North Korean Communists had 
been underway but a few short weeks when the first curbs on 
various types of construction credit became effective. Regu-
lation X was not the first measure imposed; there had been 
temporary stop-gap m~asures preceding it. 
On July 18, 1950, the President requested the Home and 
Housing Finance .dministration, the Veterans Administration 
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which at the 
time, was over the Federal National Mortgage Associa~on, to 
curtail Federal assistance to home builders. On the follow-
1 
ing days, certain restrictive measures became effective. 
July 19--Under the Federal Housing Administratton: 
1. The ratio of loan to cost was reduced by 5 per 
cent on all insurance applications, and there-
fore increasing the down payment by 5 per cent. 
2. Construction cost figures used by Federal Housi ng 
Administration for mortgage insurance analysis 
were frozen, and this increased down payments 
beyond 5 per cent. 
3. Dollar volume availability for mortgage insurance 
was reduced by a half from v l,250,000,000 to 
$650,000,000. 
1. Construction, Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, October, 1950, P 9. 
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4. Dollar mortgage limitations were reduced from 
$16,000 to $14,000 for single- unit dwellings. 
Under the Veterans Administration: 
5. No recognition was given to costs higher than on 
July 1 in estimating construction costs except 
when Washing ton agreed. The additional cost was 
to be added to the down payment. 
6. The funds available for- direct loans were decreased 
until June, 1951. 
Under the Federal Home Loan Banks: 
7. The Bank Board cut the credit extension to business 
from 50 per cent to 30 per cent of the borrowing 
capacity of member institutions. 
Auguat 1 
8. The Federal Housing Administration r equired a 10 
per cent down payment for Federal Housing Adminis-
tration insured property repair loans. 
September 8 
9. The Defense Production Act of 1950 was enacted, giv-
ing the President broad powers over credit on all 
type&l of new construction. 
September 18 
10. Regulation W was issued by the Board of Governors, 
regulating credit on durable goods. lf the loan 
was for repairs, it did require a 10 pe r cent down 
payment and a thirty-day maturity. 
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October 12 
11. Regulation X became effective with the companion 
regulation of the Veterans Administration and 
Federal Housing Administration. 
Construction, 1950: 
In the first half of 1950, residential construction was 
an expansionary force in an already fast rising economy. 
Credit had been relatively easy and the terms were fairly 
easily met. There was a vast supply of funds available from 
the usual source, such as banks, especially to those who could 
obtain Government guaranteed or insured loans. The Federal 
National Mortgage Association provided a secondary market for 
the Government guaranteed or insured loans. With the supply 
of funds large, the sm~ll down payment requirements and the 
vast backlog of liquid a ssets, residential construction was 
really booming. Recording of mortgage loans was highe r than 
they had ever been; these were largely made up of one- to 
four-family housing. 
There were 1,375,000 housing units started in 1950 , an 
2 
increa se of 35 per cent over 1939. This was a far greater 
absolute number and wa s proportionately equal to that of 1920. 
The tot ~ l amount of construction was $2?.7 billion, and more 
than 45 pe r cent of this was residential construction. 85 per 
cent of private construction was residential s i ngl e unit hous-
., 
2 . Federal Re serve Bulletin, December, 1950, P 1568. 
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3 
ing. 
On top of this building boom was added the increa sed 
demands due to the outbreak of the Korean war. Plant expan-
sion did increase, but was not a major factor until l a t er 
near the end of 1950. 
House constructi on was t he major part of building ; this 
was l a rgely due to the trend in the first part of 1950 and 
the scarce buying that followed the Korean War. Many were 
afraid that construction would become impossible later; 
renters were afraid rents would increase; it was also feared 
that the rising costs of ma terials would be greater. 
Prices wh ich had already started to rise in the first 
ha lf of 1950, rose still higher; it was imperative that con-
trols be imposed . Expansion in the materials i ndustry had 
gotten underway before the Korean War, but even with greater 
4 
output stocks were decreasing, notably lumber. Higher price s 
did not slow down construction l a r ge ly because of t he loose 
credit; it was obvious credit was one sector which had t o be 
controlled first. 
The first increase in down payments, those of July, did 
ha ve some effect but not too much . A big factor which pre-
vented the restrictions from having a full effect was the 
backlog of liquid savings. The curtailment in funds available 
for Gove rnment insurance on loans also helped some, but none 
3 . Survey of Current Business, Vol. 31 No. 2 , February, 1951 , 
p 17. 
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4. Survey of Current Busine ss, Vol. 30, No. 9, September, 1950, 
Pp 8-9. 
of these measures we re strict enough. These measures were 
not intended to solve the situation, but were to make do 
until better measures were available. 
In the fourth quarter of 1950, construction was still 
high and did not decrease as much as t~ seasonal average, 
but there was a greater division along the new patterns of 
construction. 
Although both residential and non-residential construe-
tion increased, plant expansion increased more than did 
residential. Plant expansion increased to meet defense con-
tracts and anticipated defense construction. Me tals and 
other critical material were allocated to the needs of defense 
construction, whereas materials became less available to resi-
dential construction. The shorter materials and higher prices 
caused some curtailment in residential construction; the larger 
down payments also curtailed some construction (but residen-
5 
tial construction was still considerably above normal.) 
A Federal National Mortgage Association regulation also 
made less credit available limiting its function to loans 
made before March 1, 1950; this curtailment in tbe secondary 
mortgage market made many investors more cautious about put-
ting their funds in the primary mortgage market. 
Regulation X, as became effective October 12, had little 
effect because of the carryover provisions. These exempted so 
5. loc. cit., Federal Reserve Bulletin, December, 1950. 
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many loans that there was a large amount of construction well 
into 1951. The larger down payment requirements II' evented 
some borrowing, but as in the case of the earlier credit 
restriction, the backlog of liquid assets provided many with 
the means of meeting the requirements. In September, 1950, 
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the President signed the Defense Housing and Community Facili-
ties Service Act to provide for critically needed housing in 
defense areas. This also provided for lifting of the Regulation 
to encourage construction in these areas. Where funds were 
not available for residential construction in these areas, the 
Defense Housing and Community Facilities Service Act provided 
funds for direct loans and insurance to enable credit to be 
more available in these areas. 
Summary of 1950: 
Because of the high trend in construction, the liquid 
assets, the carry-vver provision of the Regulation, and the 
credit made available by the provisions of the Government, 
6 
the effects of the restriction were very noticeable in 1950. 
Construction was curtailed somewhat, however, from the 
down payment requirement and the curtailment of available 
materials. 
Building Construction in 1951: 
In 1951, the various credit measures and policies initi-
ated by the Government a gencies and the Federal Reserve Bank 
begun to take hold. CM~ , Controlled Materials Plan, was initi-
6. These carry-over provisions a re explained in Chapter VI. 
a ted and became effective July 1, 1951. The purpose of this 
control was to a llocate critically needed materials. The 
first to come under CMP were aluminum, copper and steel. 
There was considerable expansion in these metals,' but the 
defense needs and non-defense demands were so large that it 
was necessary to have allocation. By the fourth quarter, all 
construction materials had come under CMP. 
Defense Construction: 
In 1951, defense construction really increased to new 
he i ghts; it increased 90 pe r cent from June, 1950 to December, 
7 
1951. The l argest ~rt of it was military and naval construe-
tion. 
Industria l construction ,was also a l a rge factor in defense 
construction. Where residential housing fell off in 1951, 
plant expansion continued to meet defense needs. Industrial 
construction increased from ~280 to $860 million in the June, 
1950 to Decembe r, 1951 period. This construction was stimu-
lated by various aids, the most important of these being the 
f as t amortization policy for tax purposes. For defense con-
struction on which was obtained a certificate of necessity, 
the restriction on credit controls were lifted . Demand f~ 
materials for defense construction was able to be met 100 per 
cent, another factor which helped this sector of the construc-
tion industry to increa se so much. 
7. ifConstruction Activityt. " Survey of C.iurrent Business, Vol. 
31, No. 12 , December, 1951, P 4 . 
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Defense housing was encoura ged by reloxation of the Regu-
lation snd the making avai l able of Government insurance whe r e 
needed. There were no down payment requirements providing the 
amount of the loan did not exceed t he maximum allowed under 
the Regulation . The federal Housing Administration was allowed 
to insure loans up to 90 per cent of the value if the loan was 
for critically needed defense housing . The Veterans Housing 
was again allowed to make direct loans, and a fund was set 
aside for this purpose. 
Residentia1 Construction: 
There was on increase in the value of new construction 
due entirely to higher prices.: It was estimated that materials 
8 
costs were about 9 per cent higher than during 1950. The 
volume of housing built was considerably lower, however, than 
g 
that of 1950 as is indicated in the followin g chart: 
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B. "New Construction," Survey of current Busi ness , Vol. 32, 
No. 2 , February , 1952 , P 16. 
9. Obta ined from a char t printed by Dun & Bradstreet ba sed on 
statistics of the Board of Labor ~tatistics. 
9? 
The reason for the decrease in volu~ was the credit r e stric-
·Gion of the Federal Reserve and accompanying curbs and t he 
curtailment of the seconder~ mortgage market discussed above . 
Added to these t wo major r e asons were three others: 
1. The working off of the ba cklog of exemption free 
loans. 
2. Less credit was available and tha t which was , wa s 
only available at higher rates . 
3. Shortage of materials caused higher prices ~r house . 
Although construction was lower than 1950, the 1.1 million 
starts were well a bove the 800,000 to 850,000 starts estimated 
10 
to be consistent with t he war effort. Reasons one and three 
are self-explanat ory; the second reason, the factor ~ less 
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credit being available , was,ofcourse, associated with the second-
ary borrowing market, but was mostly responsible to the rise 
in the interest rates allowed by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System as mentioned in Chapter IV. Investors , 
be ing able to obtain "good rates" in other fields tha t wer e 
11 
felt to be more de sirable , shifte d their funds. Curtail-
ment of the s e condary mortgage market was the remainder of the 
answer because of the l a r ge amount of illiquidity in mortgage 
l ending. 
The shortage of materials had very little effe ct in as 
10. Ibid. 
11. T. B. King of the Veterans Administration, Banking, Vol. 
XLIV, No. 5, November, 1951, P 83, said t ha t the short-
age of credit avai l ab l e to borrowers was not due to t he 
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12 
far as curtailing construction. Enough supplies were availa-
ble to sustain the relatively large amount of construction 
even when supplies were completely under C~~ in the fourth 
quarter. The only real pinch was in the last part of the year. 
The higher price of material and hence the higher unit cost of 
construction, about 12 per cent higher than 1950, did have an 
effect of decreasing the demand for new housing. This was 
especially true when it was seen that the Korean War would not 
be a major one and that rent controls would be continued. 
The cutback in construction was due, for the most part, 
to the real estate credit controls of the Federal Rese rve, 
13 
Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Administration. 
The down payment requirements became more difficult to meet. 
Housing starts decreased the most in the first half of 
1951, but there was another decrea se,again, of 10 per cent 
between the second and third quarter. This reduction in demand 
for housing and the greater control that was being had ove r the 
(cent) low rates in the mortgage field, but because of the 
heavy prior committments made by mortgage investors in the 
early and middle parts of 1951. He said by November, the 
situation was again becoming normal. No explanation as to 
where these prior committments were made was offered. It 
would seem logical to assume that the shortage was caused 
by the low rates existing in the mortgage field however; 
this might well have been true in the 4 per cent and 4 lj2 
pe r cent Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Adminis-
tration loan.s. 
12. T. L. Nims, Assistant Director of Saving and Mortgage 
Division, Ame rican Bankers Association, "Mortgage 
Credit," Banking, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, November, 1951, P 8. 
13. ££• citt, Survey of Current Business, December, 1951. 
in~lation brought about a relaxation of the controls. In 
September, 1951, the size of the down payment was reduced, 
14 
and the maturity on one- to four-unit houses increased. 
The advantage to veterans was also reduced so that non-vet-
erans were be tter able to finance housing. 
This was to bring the Regulation requirements into con-
formity with the provisions of the new Defense Housing and 
Community Facilities Service Act of 1951 and secondly because 
of the large cutback in real estate borrowing during the 
15 
second and third quarter of 1951. The decreased borrowing 
amounted to $500 million in the first half of 1951 in con-
trast to the 1.1 billion borrowed in tbe last half or 1950. 
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Under the revised Regulation, the maximum l e ngth of matur-
ities was increased from twenty to twenty-five years, and the 
schedule of maximum loans and minimum down payments was con-
siderably r e laxed for prices of houses from ~7,000 to ~12,000; 
over this amount, however, the terms approached those of the 
October Regulation. 
An indication of the change can be shown in the example 
of a ~10,000 house. Under the old terms, the down payment 
for a vetera n was ~1,300; under the new, this had been scaled 
1~. See Chapter IV. 
15. The Defense Housing and Community Facilities Service Act 
of 1951, effective, September 1, 1951, (same date as 
revised credit r es triction of the Federa l Re serve, Vet-
erans Administration and Federal Housing Administratton) 
wa s to provide credi t for housing in critical defense are a s. 
It provided funds and -revolving credit for the purchase 
down to $600. Non-veterans' terms were lowered, but the vet-
e rans' preference remained, though not as great. 
Restrictions on multi-unit housing were not affected. 
Multi-unit construction fell off considerably in 1951. This 
was probably due to the suspension of aid under the National 
16 
Housing Act. 
Material shortages did hinder multi-unit construction 
somewhat. Controls were imposed sooner and more stringently 
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in this field; it was even felt that the material shortage s 
were more important than the Regulation in,. curtailing construc-
17 
tion. Multi-unit builders had to apply to National Produc-
tion Authority to receive allotments. These were given depend-
ing upon the demand and the supply. 
Private, Non-residential Construction: 
Private, non-residential construction increased consider-
ably i n 1951. As mentioned above, much of it was defense con-
s truction which was being encouraged and aided by the govern-
ment to expand. There was extensive expansion in non-defense 
construction also, l a rgely due to the very favorabl~ business 
(Cont.)and repair of houses. It also extended the right of 
ve terans to obtain direct loans where credit was not 
available elsewhere. It revised downwards down payment 
requirements on both veterans and non-veterans houses 
below $12,000 and suspended Regulation X on house pur-
chases of less than $12,000. It made available ~200 
million to FN1M to make advance committments on Govern-
ment insured defense housing. These are only a few of 
the provisions of the Act. 
16. The Act, Section 608, gave the FHA authority to insure 
mortgages on multi-unit construction. 
17 • .2.£· cit., T. L. Nims·, Banking, November, 1951. 
conditions that existed for almost all types or industry in 
1951. The industrial and public utility sectors did much 
better than the commercial sector, however. Institutional 
construstion increased also, but like corunercial construc-
tion, Government policy caused a decline after the middle of 
18 
the year. This was mostly caused by the difficulty in 
obtaining materials for this type construction. Most indus-
trials were able to meet the rather strict financing terms 
of 50 per cent down payment, through liquidating rather 
large reserves of Government securities (for the large part 
before the rise in interest rate.) 
Summary, 1951: 
In 1951, it would seem that the selective credit controls 
had really taken hold; in fact, it may have been that the 
markets had been over regulated and that it was possible to 
19 
relax the restrictions somewhat. The major cause for the 
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cutback was probably the Regulation and the accompanying curbs, 
assisted by the conditions of the money market and higher 
prices. 
The effect of the Regulation and other controls can be 
seen not only in amount ~f -construction, but in the pattern 
of construction activity. 20 The increase in public and 
18. op. cit., Survey of Current Business, Februayy, 1952. 
19. ~· cit., T. B. King, Banking, Nowember, 1951. 
20. ££• cit., Survey of Current Business, February, 1952. 
plant construction was largely offset by the decrease in the 
trend of residential and other private activity. 
Despite the effect of the restrictions, the actual vol-
ume of the construction was about equal to that of 1950, a 
record year, but of a different type. 
Construction Activity, 1952: 
The total volume of new construction was about the same 
as that of 1951; the value was up 5 per cent but costs had 
21 
risen 14 per cent so there was actually very little change. 
There was a lessening in public defense spending and a de-
cline in private expansion of' defense related construction 
22 
after the first quarter. 
Def'ense Construction: 
Public defense construction was still strong, with large 
outlays on atomic energy plants and other publicly owned 
industrials. lt was greatest during the first half' of' 1952. 
Ma terials were available for defense construction through the 
allocation under Cb~. Despite the fact that defense construe-
tion was high, there were still several million dollars in 
appropriations for this purpose at the end of 1952. 
Private He sidential Construction: 
The declining trend in residential construction which had 
21. Survey of uurrent Business, Yol. 33, No. 2, i'ebruary, 1953 
p 23. 
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22. Federal Heserve Bul~tin, Vol. 38, No.8, August, 1952, ¥856. 
started in the second quarter of 1951 and halted in the fourth 
quarter, was reversed and oontinued upward in 1952. The vol-
ume for the first quarter was about 10 per cen t be l ow the same 
period of tbe previous year and about 3 per cent over the last 
23 
quarter of 1951. The Regulation and accomp anying curbs were 
relaxed still more in July. Although material scarcities had 
a l most no effect in curta iling residential construction, part 
of the increase was attributable to the greater availability 
24 
of materials. Another boost to the residential construction 
was the stimulation to bui ld before credit terms might be re-
tightened. The reduction in down payment requirements in 
July accounted for much of the broadening of the market . Many 
who purchased at this time could not have met greater down 
25 
payments (although there were still many who could have . ) 
Residential construction increased in the rest c£ 1952, on the 
whole. The volume of Federal Housing Administration insured 
and Veterans Administration guaranteed loans decrease some-
what, however, while conventional loans increased. Fe deral 
Housing Administration insured and Veterans Administration 
guaranteed loans were getting more support from the FN]M and 
were in increasing demands. ','/i th better conditions in the 
secondary mortgage market, there were more funds available for 
lending on the Veterans Administration and Fede r a l Housing 
23 . Survey of Current Business , Vol. 32, No. 4 , April , 1952, 
F 9. 
24 . Ibid. 
25 . Ibid. 
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Administration loans a lthough there was a gitation for higher 
interest rates. The real stimulation to residential construe~ 
ti on came about when the Regulation was lifted in September. 
The easing of credit restricti ons and the final lifting 
of Regulation X apparantly offset the effect of higher build-
ing costs in 1952. 
Private Non-Residential Construction: 
Private industrial construction was up 10 per cent in 
26 
1952, but the trend was downward at the end of the year. 
Commercial construction increased after the midpoint; this 
was due to the greater availability of materials; however, 
credit terms under the Regulation remained the same. Institu-
tional construction followed commercial construction quite 
closely in trend. 
Summary, 1952: 
In 1952, all building seemed to have picked up in vol-
ume. The Regulation, having been relaxed, helped construction, 
but the decrease in defense construction in some parts pre-
vented some multi-unit housing and less one- to four-unit hous-
ing from being buillt for fear that there muld be "ghost towns" 
should the defense spending be curtailed. Ea sement of the 
money market situations, namely, additiona l credit being avail-
able and the authority of FNMA to continue operations in Govern-
ment insured loans, helped considerably. A greater supply of 
26. 2£• cit., Survey of Current Business, February, 1953 
materials was another ~actor in encouraging construction, 
especially the larger multi-unit construction and larger one-
to four-family unit construction, as unde r the self certifi-
cation plan l a rge dwelling builders could not always obtain 
the necessary materials. On the whole, the construction 
building industry was much encouraged by events in 1952. 
Lifting of Regulation X: 
Conventional loans were freed from Federa l credit curbs 
by suspension of Regulation X by the Board of Governors on 
September 15, 1952, as; the seasonally adjusted loans for 
June, July and August were below the 1.2 million set by the 
Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952. This applied to 
conventional housing loans and not to Government aided hous-
ing; that is, on the conventional loans, there will no longer 
be Federal restrictions on down payment, maximum loans and 
27 
ma turi ties. It was felt better to suspend the Regulation 
completely rather than continue with a 5 per cent down pay-
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ment requirement. Commercial construction was also freed from 
the Federal controls imposed February 15, 1951, which required 
a 50 per cent down payment. 
The Housing and Home Finance Agency instructed the Federal 
Housing Administration, Veterans Administration and the u. s. 
Department of Agriculture to relax credit restrictions on 
28 
house loans aided or made by the Government. Minimum do wn 
27. Construction, September, 1952, P 31 
28. Ibid. 
10? 
payments reverted back to 5 per cent as stipulated under the 
National Housing Act for one- to four-unit houses and a maxi-
mum loan of ~~ 14,000 set for single unit dwellings. Veterans 
Administration guaranteed loans also had a down payment require-
ment of 5 per cent on houses over $8,400; none was required 
on houses less than $?,600. Between ~?,600 and ~8,400, a 4 
per cent down payment was required. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
A genera l tightening of credit affected all sectors of 
the eeonomy. It is hoped in this chapter to conclude the 
effect ttle monetsry and selective controls or the Federal 
Reserve Bank and credit r estrict ions of other ~overrurent 
agencies had upon building construction. 
Effec t of Monetary Controls: 
The comme rcial banks be ing the ma jor suppliers of funds, 
a n expansion or a contraction of their loans directly affec t 
the amount of money in cir culation. Most of the ir deposits 
are credit extended , and,as a group,the amount of cre dit 
they can extend depends on the· reserves they can put up . 
The result then, of raisi ng reserve requirements for a ll 
banks can limit the amount of credit extended, as if all 
banks have to increase their reserves, there will not be any 
great amount of inter-borrowing . This wa s the purpose and 
result of raisi ng the rese rve requireme n t s of the commerc i a l 
banks in 1950 , as curtailment of credit in one sector affects 
others. 
Raising the interest had it s effect on long-te rm l e nders; 
if t hey thought a rise in rates was coming, they would be 
reluctant to lend out a~ the existing rate mostly be cause of 
the capital loss and if a rise were allowed before they oould 
a ct t hey would not liquidate· their present securities as 
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there would be a capital loss in that action . If rate s were 
allowed to rise, tlliiis would then cur tail long-term lending 
until the rates had settled or were once again stable . This 
probably accounted for the shortage of credit in most of 
1951 for Government insured and guaranteed loans. 
A rise in interest rate also affects the construction 
of new assets in that the .rise causes already constructed 
assets to decline in value in the same manner as it does 
securities. Thus, it is often times cheaper to buy an 
109 
already constructed asset than to build a new one. This 
effect is fairly important in home, plant and other non-
residential construction. The higher costs and shorter ma-
turities lent greater strength to this effect, house construc-
tion especially. 
Changing the rediscount rate did not seem to have too 
much influence; this control has been relatively ineffective 
for several years. 
Effect of Selective Controls on Real Estate: 
Regulation X and accompanying curbs of the Veterans Admin-
istration and Fe deral Housing Administration had their great-
est effect in the ci. own payment; the maturity requirements did 
have an influence, e specially on the Veterans Administration 
and Federal Housing Administration loans. Many conventional 
l oans however, were written for twenty years even before the 
Re gulation. 
The Regulation was the major factor in curtailing con-
struction during the tiroo the restriction was in force. The 
e f fect was rather slight in 1950 due to the carry-over pro-
vision; in 1951, however, it did have a real effect, espec-
ially in residential and commercial construction. VVhen the 
restrictions were relaxed, in September of 1951, there was an 
almost immediate effect, though not a great one; again, when 
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it was relaxed in July, 1952, there was another upsurge. The 
real effect was seen when the Regulation was lifted oompletely 
and the Veterans Administration and Federal Housing Adminis-
tration curbs relaxed to a 5 per cent down payment on Septem-
ber 6, 1952. In November, the number of housing starts was 
above that for 1951 and kept on increasing way into thefirst 
quarter of 1953. The high rate of housing starts in the first 
quarter is an indication of the strength of the demand for 
housing that started in 1949. This demand had been pretty well 
dampened in 1951 and most of 1952 by the restrictions, but 
with the ending of tbe restrictions, it once again came to the 
fore. 
Commercial construction showed an even more signig icant 
advance than did residential construction. This type of con-
struction responded rather quickly to easement in controls as 
was indica ted in the market rise in mid 1952. The r e striction 
on t h is type of const~uction had been more severe, and when 
they were li~ted, a rather l a r ge backlog of needed construction 
had accumulated . ..tt'or · the first quarter of 1953, it indicated 
an snnual rate of :irl3 billion,more than one fifth that o:f 
1952. 
Industrial construction was rather mixed; non-essential 
construction increa sed strongly a:f ter the restriction. Essen-
tial construction had been high until mid 1952 as it was r e l a-
tively :free of credit restrictions when there had been need 
:for pl ant expansion. 
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Aside from the credit restrictions there we re other imped-
iments to construction. As mentioned above, the interest rate 
ri se had a mrect and an indirect e:ffect on construction; higher 
prices a nd in a f ew instances, scarcity of materials also had 
some ef:fect. Added to t h is there was the :fluctuations due to 
the curtailing of some restrictions causing some to unde rtake 
construct ion rather than chance the future; others waited for 
conditions to become better. Another factor which affected 
construction wa s the continuation of r ent controls which de-
creased t he demand for houses of those who were r€11 t ing and 
those who built to r ent. 
Residentia l construction wa s hampered by higher cost s of 
financing and building; however, t h is wa s probab l y a secondary 
effect for the most part. Materia l shortages were rela tive ly 
imma t eria l in r e side ntial construc t ion except in some ca ses 
for l ar ge single units and for multi-uni t residenti a l construc-
tion as in the ca se of .hote·ls, etc. 
Commercial construction wa s t he most seriously e ffe cted 
by rna t e r i al sh ortages; espe cially i n the l at t e r ha l f of 1951. 
Al ong with commerci al construct.ion, public non-essentia l con-
struction , such a s schools, librarie s, etc., were slowed down 
i n many instances for lack of such supplies as building steel 
and wiring . Utilities and non-e ssential industrial cons truc-
tion continued to e xpand a s demand and general bus iness co n-
ditions we re so favor able, but at a limited r a te for the mos t 
part . Because of the various restrictions ,Certif icates of 
Necessity we re gr a nted often times to utilities; this he l ped 
ma i n tain this ~pe of construction. 
Indirec t Effect of Credit Restriction: 
Curtai lmen t of construction doe s not affect only tha t 
sector of the ~~ condary industry, but it has a r a the r e x t en• 
s ive indirect effect . The demand for furniture, household 
appliances, etc. was seriously a f f e cted by the amount of the 
deM9nd that was not pr esent be cause some units were not built . 
(This helped out Regulation W in its t ask against inflati on .) 
Because of the wide spread effect o~ bui lding construc-
tion, it is one of the first to be curta iled in times of in-
f lation and material shortages. 
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All in a ll, the net effect of the building construction 
credit regulation seems to have been quite effe ctive . It is 
true other factors did help, but had there not been a dampen-
ing effect a t the source , the inflation and ma teria l shortages 
would have been much more severe. The Re gulation ha s generally 
been conside r ed a succe ss. 
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AN ABSTRACT OF 'THE THESIS 
The oim of t he t h s is has been to provide what is prob-
a bly the first extensive written discussion of the opera-
tion of housing credit controls, and specifically Regula tion 
X. In a sense, the thesis is complete ly original in tha t 
any written matter a bout it is quite sparse, and, a ga in, 
there may be little really origina l works in it a s almost 
all the data came from various Government agencies. 
I n order to better understand the need for the Regula-
tion and the role, in genera l, of se lective credit cont rols, 
a backgr o und was set up in the early part of the t he sis. 
This subject i n itse lf could be the basis of an extensive 
work, but of necessity, had to be made brief; however, it 
is ho~ed that it can be seen from this discussion t he need 
for credit control in an economy. Chapte r Six, probab l y , 
the only real ly origina l work in the thesis, is an attempt 
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to illustrate the role building construction has in i nfluenc-
i n g inflation. Even though the v a lues derived s e em r a the r 
l a r ge , the concept a s put forth in the chapter itse lf is 
proba bly quite rea listic. Be cause of the i mportance of t he 
building industry in the economy, the building cycle is no 
myth, and when one cons i ders the effect that building did 
have in the years studied here, the i mp,ortance of sele ctive 
credit r estriction on hou sing is f urther emphasized . The 
Regu l a tion could not, as originally intended , be studied i n 
itself, as even though it was the basis of building credit 
restrictions, it was only one aspect in restrictions on 
housing and a small part of the large net of credit curtail-
ment throughout the economy. Because of its integration in 
the credit sector, it was necessary to bring a short dis-
cussion of other aspects of tbe general credit restriction 
program. Even this chapter did not bring in all the measure s 
involved, but it may help to show the extent to which credit 
was curtailed in the economy. 
The Regulation, as inforced by the Board of Governors, 
was the pattern, in a sense, on which other housing credit 
restrictions were based. It was discussed in a brief form 
and in the a ppendix to that chapter in a far more detailed 
coverage. For the average reader the abstract of the Regula-
tion was all that would be wanted. As restrictions were 
eased, the down payment requirements were not so severe and 
the maximum loans and maturities increased. New schedules 
were needed; not all of these appear but enough are shown to 
illustrate the genera l a pplication. 
A survey for the Board of Governors of the effect of ih e 
Regulation for the first five months of the Re gulation gave a 
rather interesting picture of buying trends in the economy 
after the restrictions were imposed as compared with before. 
Through a little study, it was possible to exyend the cover-
age for tbe purpose of the chapter without making any mater-
ial difference in the re'sult's. .A greater study was made to 
11? 
cover the rest of tile period of the Regulation, but the pat-
tern seemed fairly well set by March of 1951, and there was 
little change in it after that time. 
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The genera l picture of construction activity was a ltered 
almost immediately afte r the beginning of the Korean ~ar. 
Although construction was still l a r gely made up of residen-
tial construction, a new pattern be gan to deve lop and con-
struction began to divide itself more and more a l ong these 
lines. The shift in emphasis was very slight at first, but 
with time it became more pronounced. Credit restrictions on 
priva~e residential housing , which were effected in July, were 
strengthened throughout the rest of the year. !;laterials 
became le s s ava ilable for some types of private construction 
as needs for defense increased and as these latter needs were 
given priority in a lloca tion; material shortages, for the most 
part, were rather insignificant in so far a s any rea l curta il-
ment of' construction went, however. As credit restrictions 
by all agencies were tightened up and no down payment loans 
were discontinued, the demand for housing began to decre ase . 
Outstanding committments helped to continue the trend set in 
the earlier half of 1950, but this ran out in early 1951. 
In t ha t year, 1951, the effect of credit r e strictions 
was especially noticeable. Restrictions were broadened to 
include one- to four-family units and multi-family unit hous-
ing and residential structure; non-residential construction 
wa s a lso strongly affected. Es pecially true of the non-re si-
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dential construction wa s commerical construction. Credit an d 
materials were more stringently allocated than in other types 
of construction. 
The pattern set in 1950 was more pronounced in 1951. The 
decrease in residentia l construction was offset by a big in-
crease in defe nse construction. This type of construction 
was free of a ll restrictions and had been allowed liberal 
amortization, and necessary materials had been made available. 
By 1951, the backlog of restriction-free construction 
was running . out. The large down payment requirements were prob-
ab ly the most effective aspe ct of the Regu lation and accom-
panying curbs. This was e.specially true of veterans loans . 
The shorter ma turities also had their effect in raising the 
"rent" of house buyers. The effect of the restriction was so 
that it wa s felt that a slight relaxation could be allowed 
even though housing starts were considerably above tha t felt 
consistent with the defense effort. Again, in 1951, materi als 
were somewha t scarcer, but had no real effect in curtailing 
construction. 
The following year, residential construction remained 
low until 'the middle of the year when the restrictions we.re 
relaxed still more. In the l a st quarter, howeve r, after the 
Regulation and other curbs we re l ifted, constructi on of all 
types, but especially housing and commerica l, incre ased; the 
latter sho·t up and increased over 50 per cent by the first 
quarter of 1953. 
The lifting of the Regulation was made possibJe by the 
greater supply of ma t e rials and the leveling off of defense 
construction. as mentioned, ma t e rial shortage s had only a 
small effect in curtailing building construction; however, 
had there not been restrictions on credit, the bidding by 
the non-essential and essential needs would certainly have 
caused a shortage. ~ s it was, stocks we re depleted in 1951 
and 1952 de spite a great increase i n productivity. 
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No one may fully appreciate the effect Regulation X and 
a ccompanying curbs had in helping prevent a greater infla-
tion than there was. It is not put forth that these restric-
tions were wha t prevented inflation, but it can be seen from 
the chap ter on the Building Cycle, the influence tha t this 
sector of the economy has upon the ~hole. 
The consensus of this the sis is that the Regu la t ion ful-
filled the role it was expected to and the resources and 
inflationary s i tuation were eased considera bly because of it. 
* * * *' * * 
